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EXPANDING REGIONAL RENEWABLE GOVERNANCE
Hannah Wiseman*
Energy drives economies and quality of life, yet accessible traditional fuels are
increasingly scarce.  Federal, state, and local governments have thus determined
that renewable energy development is essential and have passed substantial require-
ments for its use.  These lofty goals will fail, however, if policymakers rely upon
existing institutions to govern renewable development.  Renewable fuels are fugitive
resources, and ideal property for renewable technology is defined by the strength of
the sunlight or wind that flows over it.  When a potential site for a utility-scale
development is identified, a new piece of property, which I call a “renewable par-
cel,” is superimposed upon existing boundaries and jurisdictional lines.  The entities
within the parcel all possess rights to exclude, and this creates a tragedy with an-
ticommons and regulatory commons elements, which hinder renewable development.
In a renewable parcel, numerous rights of exclusion in the form of fee simple
ownership, leasing rights, use rights, and regulation make use of a renewable parcel
difficult and create anticommons-type problems.  The multiple jurisdictions that may
underlie the parcel also lead to a regulatory commons, wherein no one government
is sufficiently incentivized to create a workable governance regime.
This Article argues that the many exclusion rights within renewable parcels
must be consolidated and governed by a regional agency to address these barriers to
renewable development, and it analyzes elements of existing regional institutions to
begin to suggest the ideal structure of this agency.  Once formed, the regional frame-
work should be applied to other areas of energy planning.  States and municipalities
share oil and gas reservoirs, electricity transmission constraints, and energy genera-
tion needs, and collaborative governance in these areas is necessary for a secure
future.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy is the necessary driver of economic growth and quality of life1
— of manufacturing, commerce, communications, health services, and com-
fortable living spaces.  Yet clean, affordable energy is an increasingly scarce
commodity.  America’s economy relies primarily upon finite2 fossil fuels,3
which are increasingly demanded by other growing nations.4  In 2010, a coal
mining accident5 and oil gushing into the Gulf of Mexico6 were unusually
vivid reminders of the consequences of this pattern, but a growing thirst for
energy and diminishing supplies of conventional fuel have offered constant,
less vivid warning signs since the 1970s.7  America must move toward a
1 See David Lewis, Hydrogen and its Relationship with Nuclear Energy, 50 PROGRESS IN
NUCLEAR ENERGY 394, 394 (2008) (explaining that “energy input to society is necessary to
fuel economic development” and that “[a] nation’s GDP/capita/annum and energy use/capita/
annum are directly linked”).
2 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2003 v (2004),
available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/multifuel/038403.pdf (describing fossil fuels as “finite in
supply.”).
3 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 5
(2010) [hereinafter EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 09], available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
aer/pdf/aer.pdf (showing that petroleum, natural gas, and coal made up more than 82% of total
primary energy consumption in the United States in 2009).
4 In July 2010, China’s energy consumption officially exceeded the United States’ con-
sumption. See Spencer Swartz & Shai Oster, China Tops U.S. in Energy Use, WALL ST. J.,
July 18, 2010, at A1.
5 See Mario Parker, Massey Expects West Virginia Coal Mine Disaster Will Cost $212
Million, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 22, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-
22/massey-expects-212-million-second-quarter-charge-for-fatal-mine-accident.html (explain-
ing that 29 people were killed in an underground mining explosion).
6 See John M. Broder, Energy Secretary Emerges to Take a Commanding Role in Effort to
Corral Well, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at B1 (explaining that more than 100 million gallons
of oil flowed into the Gulf from BP’s damaged well).
7 See IGOR I. KAVASS & DORIS M. BIEBER, ENERGY AND CONGRESS: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND REPORTS 1974–1978 vi–vii (1980)
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modernized energy system — one that will guarantee a reliable energy sup-
ply for future generations and offer current generations adequate energy
without overly compromising health and environmental quality.8  Renewable
energy, which is produced from abundant fuels that are replenished within a
human lifetime,9 will be an essential component of this system.  Congress
and state governments have already recognized this and have passed incen-
tives for the development of renewable infrastructure10 and ambitious re-
quirements or goals for its use.11  Without an improved governance structure
(describing 1974 as the year “when the concern about oil and other energy sources began to
intensify in the United States Congress”); THE NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING
THE STALEMATE: A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES vi
(2004), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/endi_en_stlmate.pdf (observ-
ing that “[r]ecent developments in world oil markets, including rapid growth in global de-
mand and the emergence of terrorist threats to oil facilities, are bringing new urgency to
perennial concerns about the nation’s exposure to oil price shocks and supply distributions”).
8 America’s bipartisan energy commission concluded that “[r]eliable access to the energy
resources needed to support a healthy economy remains the core imperative, but in the 21st
century energy security also means reducing the macroeconomic and terrorism-related vulner-
abilities inherent in the current geopolitical distribution of oil supply and demand and coming
to grips with environmental impacts of the current energy system.” NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY
POLICY, supra note 7, at vi.  With respect to the role of renewable energy in the modernized R
energy system, the Director of the Office of Energy Projects of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has stated that “renewable energy is going to figure prominently in
FERC’s activities.” Janice M. Schneider et al., The Future of Siting and Building Energy Infra-
structure, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10363, 10364 (2010).  Similarly, the Execu-
tive Director of the International Energy Agency has stated that “[r]enewable energy
technologies are a crucial element in achieving a balanced global energy future.”  Press Re-
lease, Int’l Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Technologies to Play an Important Role in a
Clean, Clever, and Competitive Energy Future (Feb. 14, 2006), available at http://www.
iea.org/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=172.  Governors of both Republican and Dem-
ocratic states have also recognized the necessity of renewable energy. See, e.g., Expansion of
Renewable Energy, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR RICK PERRY, http://governor.state.tx.us/priori-
ties/infrastructure/energy/expansion_of_renewable_energy/ (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (describing Texas’s rising demand for energy and iden-
tifying renewable energy as playing a “key role” in diversifying the energy mix to meet future
demand); Kerry Davis, O’Malley Touts Offshore Wind Farms, SOUTHERN MARYLAND ONLINE,
http://somd.com/news/headlines/2011/13359.shtml (describing Maryland’s governor’s support
for wind farms).
9 Alicia Valero et al., Inventory of the Exergy Resources on Earth Including its Mineral
Capital, 35 ENERGY 989, 989 (2009) (defining renewable resources as resources “that are
regenerated on a human timescale.”); see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 2 R
(describing renewable energy as “essentially inexhaustible because it can be replenished”).
10 See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (1992) (providing a production
credit for renewable energy); Jessica A. Graf, Federal Stimulus Provisions for Renewable En-
ergy Development, Including Cash Grants, PROB. & PROP., May-June 2010, at 58–59
(describing federal incentives for renewable energy which began in the late 70s, the expanded
tax credit for renewables provided by the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009,
and a cash grant for renewables under that same Act); Financial Incentives for Renewable
Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.
dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre.cfm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (showing that all fifty states have passed monetary incentives for renewa-
ble energy).
11 See, e.g., Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Exec. Order No. S-14-08 (Nov.
17, 2008), available at http://www.gov38.ca.gov/index.php?/print-version/executive-order/
11072/ (providing that in California, “[a]ll retail sellers of electricity shall serve 33 percent of
their load with renewable energy by 2020”).  Thirty-three other states and the District of Co-
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for this energy transition, however, the growth of a renewable energy infra-
structure will be costly, slow, and inadequate.
Developing a renewable energy infrastructure will pose several chal-
lenges, and one of the largest among them will be effective governance.
Some of the cleanest and most abundant forms of renewable energy, sunlight
and wind,12 are unlike any of the traditional resources that dominate
America’s current energy infrastructure.  Renewable fuels are fugitive re-
sources, and technology such as wind turbines or solar collectors must be
located on the land over which the fuels flow in order to capture them.13
When utility-scale renewables — large installations that rival traditional
power plants in the quantity of electricity that they produce14 — are devel-
oped, a new artificial parcel of property is created.  This parcel is defined by
the intensity of sunlight that beats down on land or the strength of the wind
that blows across it.  This artificial piece of property, which this Article calls
a “renewable parcel,” is not defined by existing boundary lines or jurisdic-
tions and thus often overlies several towns, counties, federally-owned or
-managed lands, or even states.15  The transmission lines necessary to trans-
port energy from a renewable parcel also must run for hundreds of miles,
typically across multiple jurisdictions, to reach human populations.16  These
unique qualities of the renewable resource pose distinct17 challenges to the
governance of renewable energy development.  First, at its most basic level,
the imposition of a fugitive estate (consisting of rights to sunlight or wind)
over the land surface leads to an assembly problem, wherein a developer
lumbia have passed similar requirements or goals for renewable energy use, although typically
at a lower percentage. See Renewable Portfolio Standards Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.
epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
12 The energy from the sun heating the land and oceans is approximately equivalent to
“three thousand times the present power needs of the entire world.”  Valero et al., supra note
9, at 992.  And “even if only ~20% of . . . [the global wind power generated at locations with R
mean annual wind speeds = 6.9 m/s [meters per second] . . . for the year 2000] could be
captured, it could satisfy 100% of the world’s energy demand for all purposes.” Cristina L.
Archer & Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of Global Wind Power, 110 J. GEOPHYS. RES.
D12110, at 1 (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/winds/2004
jd005462.pdf.
13 See Hadassah M. Reimer & Sandra A. Snodgrass, Tortoises, Bats, and Birds, Oh My:
Protected Species Implications for Renewable Energy Projects, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 583
(2010) (“Solar projects must be placed where there is ample sunlight. A wind project where
there is no wind is a waste of time and money.”).
14 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY
ZONES – PHASE 1 REPORT 2 n.1 (2009), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/
WREZ09.pdf (defining “utility-scale” renewables as those with the potential to produce 1,500
megawatts of solar or wind power).
15 See infra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining that more than fifteen of the
areas identified as ideal renewable zones in the West cover more than one state).
16 See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining R
that many of the “vast renewable resources” in the West “reside in remote areas without ready
or cost effective access to transmission”).
17 Michael Heller introduced the concept of the anticommons in 1998. See Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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must persuade each and every property owner beneath the fugitive estate to
grant, at minimum, a use right to the surface.  But even where an ideal fugi-
tive estate does not cross any boundaries on the surface and covers only one
property, owned in fee simple, a renewable developer faces challenges be-
yond assembly.  A renewable parcel contains anticommons-type qualities,
wherein excessive exclusion rights to a property parcel lead to its underuse
or, at minimum, higher transaction costs associated with its use.  Further, the
mismatch between renewable development and existing governing institu-
tions — which results in no institution having primary authority over the
developed resource — leads to a regulatory commons.18  There are currently
no adequate governance structures to address these challenges, and this Arti-
cle argues that a regional governance regime must be implemented to ensure
efficient siting of utility-scale renewables.
The assembly problem suggesting the need for a regional governance
structure is relatively straightforward, but the anticommons and regulatory
commons qualities of renewable parcel require more detailed introduction.
Anticommons, which were first comprehensively identified and described by
Michael Heller,19 arise when multiple users of a finite resource hold the right
to exclude others from the resource, thus preventing its efficient use.  One
individual may own a piece of land, for example, but lack the right to use the
property.  Another individual may own the right of use and production but
not the right to sell products from the property, and so on.20  In cases of
anticommons tragedy,21  this means that the resource cannot be efficiently
used, and its benefits are wasted.22  The anticommons is what Heller de-
scribes as a mirror image23 of the familiar commons problem, which arises
when numerous individuals share property rights in a finite resource pool,
such as a fishery, and none of the individuals collecting the resource from
the pool may exclude other users.24  Anticommons allow too much exclusion
from use,25 while commons allow too little; both can lead to failure.
18 William Buzbee introduced the concept of the regulatory commons in 2003. See Wil-
liam W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
19 See Heller, supra note 17.  Heller notes that prior to his article, Bob Ellickson men- R
tioned an anticommons form of property in a footnote, using a wilderness preserve as an
example, and that others described the idea in theory. Id. at 667–68 (citing Robert C. Ellick-
son, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22 (1993)).  Heller was the first, however,
to provide a “useful definition” and apply the concept to real life. Id. at 668.
20 See id. at 623 (explaining that in a typical anticommons, exemplified by a Moscow
storefront, “one owner may be endowed initially with the right to sell, another to receive sale
revenue, and still others to lease, receive lease revenue, occupy, and determine use”).
21 See id. at 624 (introducing the term).
22 Id. at 676–77.
23 Id. at 623.
24 Hardin first introduced the concept of the commons in Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).  His example of a quintessential commons was a pasture
where all herdsmen had a right to graze their livestock. Id. at 1244.
25 See Heller, supra note 17, at 624 (explaining that “[w]hen there are too many owners R
holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse”).
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Somewhat similar to the anticommons tragedy, a regulatory commons,
as introduced and defined by William Buzbee, also arises in “complex, mul-
tilayered legal regimes.”26  In a regulatory commons, a local activity or a
combination of such activities has negative, often external effects (“social
ills”), and there are no governance institutions that have primary jurisdiction
over these effects or sufficient incentives to regulate them; the regulatory
regime itself is a commons resource.27  As Buzbee explains, “[i]n settings
of regulatory fragmentation, mismatch, and overlap, regulatory commons
dynamics will exist.”28
The fuels that produce renewable energy — although a common pool
— are nondepletable and do not pose traditional commons problems.  On a
global scale, sunlight and wind do not generally decline in quantity when
harvested,29 unlike schools of fish or grass in a pasture.  The barriers to re-
newable energy thus arise not from the fuel itself but in the siting of technol-
ogy to capture the abundant fuel; this is where the potential anticommons
and regulatory commons tragedies emerge.
Land is a necessary element of renewable energy production, yet multi-
ple individuals and institutions hold rights to this land and prevent efficient
levels of use.  Within one renewable parcel — even one that does not cross
boundaries — one individual may own fee simple rights to the surface, an-
other may own use rights, a third may claim the right to the fugitive resource
flowing over the surface, a fourth may possess the right to block the fugitive
resource that flows through the parcel, and multiple other entities may,
through regulation, block the construction of the technology required to cap-
ture sunlight or wind.  Where a renewable parcel crosses existing bounda-
ries, even more individuals may hold fee simple ownership and use rights
within the parcel.  Several municipalities may also have the right to issue (or
block) a permit to build the renewable technology,30 thus preventing the use
of the land even if a renewable developer overcomes leasing hurdles.  And
again, several state and federal agencies may block the use of the property
on environmental, cultural, or historical grounds.31  One proposed wind farm
in California, for example, would cover more than 15,500 acres of land;
various portions of this parcel are privately owned, managed by the Bureau
of Land Management and the California State Land Commission, held by
26 Buzbee, supra note 18, at 5. R
27 See id. at 22.
28 Id. at 21–22.
29 Locally, however, wind turbines substantially reduce the quantities of wind for down-
wind users, thus leading to disagreements among wind developers. See Troy Rule, A Down-
wind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
207, 208 (2009) (“The ‘wake’ of a commercial wind turbine causes turbulence and unsteady
wind flow that can reduce the productivity of other wind turbines situated nearby.”).
30 See infra text accompanying note 175 (describing how the largest wind farm on the East R
Coast had to obtain zoning-related approval from four towns).
31 See infra text accompanying note 165. R
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the Ewiiaapaayp Tribe, and governed by San Diego County.32  As a result of
these types of layered rights to exclude, the Western Governors’ Association
has noted that “political and regulatory obstacles to the permitting and con-
struction of . . . renewable energy products”33 must be overcome if renewa-
ble development is to succeed.
While numerous entities hold regulatory powers and property rights to
exclude potential renewable developers from a renewable parcel, this appar-
ent “overregulation” by an array of entities and institutions has substantial
regulatory gaps; as often occurs within regulatory commons, no one entity
has taken the helm to form a comprehensive regulatory structure for renew-
ables development.  A new form of regional governance institution must
thus emerge to address the anticommons and related regulatory commons
tragedy in renewable development.  These institutions, which this Article
describes as  regional energy boards, must bundle together the multiple ex-
clusion rights to renewable parcels — including private, municipal, state,
and federal ownership and regulation — and must consolidate them into a
coherent framework.  The boards must be independent institutions with reg-
ulatory powers, and they must use these powers to resolve overlapping and
conflicting rights and provide streamlined yet thorough processes for the
approval of renewable energy siting and construction.
Once formed and tested, a regional energy governance34 structure
should also be employed for energy issues beyond renewables — issues that
do not necessarily exhibit tragic anticommons qualities but that pose re-
gional challenges.  In addition to shared sun and wind resources, many states
have oil and gas reservoirs in common.35  In the Northeast, for example,
geologists recently discovered that a massive shale formation underlying
much of Appalachia — the Marcellus Shale — is an abundant source of now
accessible unconventional natural gas.36  Pennsylvania has allowed rapid gas
production from the shale,37 while New York has imposed a moratorium un-
til it better understands the effects of this production;38 municipalities have
32 See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed
Tule Wind Project and the Proposed East County Substation Project, San Diego, CA, 74 Fed.
Reg. 68,860 (Dec. 29, 2009).
33 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 19. R
34 This term does not arise in the legal literature, but one editorial in Global Environmen-
tal Change uses it. See Anthony G. Patt, Effective Regional Energy Governance — Not
Global Environmental Governance — Is What We Need Right Now for Climate Change, 20
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 33, 33 (2010).
35 See infra note 405. R
36 See Terry Engelder, Marcellus, FORT WORTH BASIN OIL & GAS MAG., Aug. 2009, at 22,
available at http://www.geosc.psu.edu/~engelder/references/link155.pdf (describing a calcula-
tion yielding a “50 percent probability that the Marcellus will ultimately yield 489” trillion
cubic feet of natural gas).
37 Wells Drilled, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., BUREAU OF OIL & GAS MGMT., http://www.
dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Website%20Pictures/2009/2009%20%
20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (updated Jan. 25, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(showing 768 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in Pennsylvania in 2009 as reported by operators).
38  DIV. OF MINERAL RES., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REG-
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also attempted to impose their own limitations on gas development.39  These
and several other Appalachian states are struggling to appropriately regulate
extraction techniques40 and to determine an acceptable pace of development.
While anticommons-type problems associated with unsustainable resources,
such as fossil fuels, may not from a social policy perspective merit as broad
of a solution as that proposed for renewables, collaboration through a re-
gional governing entity would assist entities governing natural gas extraction
as they struggle to catch up with and effectively regulate a rapid energy
transition.
Beyond oil and gas, states in regions with limited access to electricity
transmission or energy production share high energy prices and concerns
about a reliable energy supply.41  Coordinated planning for future energy
development — constructing a power plant on the state border, for example,
or expanding transmission lines from a power source outside of the region
— could effectively address states’ energy challenges.  The southeastern
states have identified this need and have formed the Southern States Energy
Compact, which recognizes that “optimum benefit from and acquisition of
energy resources and facilities require systemic encouragements, guidance,
and assistance from the party states on a cooperative basis.”42
Other states, recognizing the importance of regional decisionmaking to
energy siting, have specifically empowered their agencies to participate in
regional energy forums.43  Yet despite the clear need for a regional approach
ULATORY PROGRAM 1-1 (2009), available at ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/OGd-
SGEISFull.pdf (describing the hold on high water volume hydraulic fracturing permits in New
York State).
39 See, e.g., Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 723, 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2010) (discussing a Pennsylvania County zoning ordinance that allowed the zoning board to
place additional conditions on gas wells and require a permit, and holding that the ordinance is
not preempted by state law); Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of
Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 858, 866 (Pa. 2009) (describing a town’s objection to a gas well on
zoning grounds); Range Resources v. Salem Township, 964 A.2d 869, 870, 877 (Pa. 2009)
(describing a town’s attempt to regulate surface use “associated with oil and gas drilling”).
40 See generally Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229 (2010) (describing increased fracturing activity in Maryland, Ohio, and
West Virginia and some of these states’ modified regulations in response to the activity).
41 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 6–7 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transmission-grid.pdf (“As customer
demand in an area surpasses the import capability of the transmission lines serving that area,
operators are forced to meet the area’s energy demand with more expensive local generation
rather than less expensive generation from elsewhere in the region.”); id. at 11–14 (describing
the high level of transmission congestion in the East); see also Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi,
Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in
Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 712 (2010) (defining
“sink” states as “those . . . that consume more power than they produce within their borders,”
and describing the need to move “power from the producing ‘source’ states to the energy ‘sink’
states”).
42 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-10-1 (West 2010).
43 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.040(11) (2010) (empowering the State of Washing-
ton Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council to “present state concerns and interests to other
states, regional organizations, and the federal government on the location, construction, and
operation of any energy facility which may affect the environment, health, or safety of the
citizens of the state of Washington”).
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to large-scale renewable energy development and energy planning more gen-
erally, the regional institutional framework lacks a coherent delineation in
the literature44 and has not yet been adopted on a meaningful scale.45  The
western states have embarked upon a regional effort to identify ideal areas
for renewable energy development — many of which cross state and munic-
ipal lines — and to encourage transmission from these areas.46  But even in
the West, many states continue to diverge widely in their priorities for and
approaches to energy development,47 and this accentuates the challenges to
renewable development.  The Western Governors’ Association has suggested
that “standardized, streamlined, fast-track permitting procedures should be
implemented” for utility-scale renewable plants.48
Although regional institutions have not widely emerged in the energy
field, several existing regional governance structures can serve as models for
the development of new energy institutions; these institutions have the au-
thority to control land use activities and thus provide useful models for re-
newable governance.  Interstate compact commissions for water basins, for
example, govern states’ uses of shared river water.  The commissions are
independent, congressionally-approved regional institutions that issue bind-
ing regulations for water use and sometimes water quality,49 and they have
some land use authority in order to protect water quality.50  Similarly, the
independent Tahoe Regional Planning Authority enacts land use regulations
in the states within the Lake Tahoe watershed.51  The most successful com-
44 Many authors have provided valuable pieces to the regional governance literature in the
energy field, and this Article attempts to contribute one more piece.  Robin Kundis Craig has
addressed the constitutionality of “[m]ultistate efforts to encourage, market, transmit, or dis-
tribute renewable energy.” See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the
Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 771, 771 (2010).  Jim Rossi has recognized that heightened regional govern-
ance over electricity transmission is likely inevitable but that “the precise form of regional
governance bodies and the role states will play in the regional governance process seems quite
uncertain.”  Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority,
39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1045 (2009).  David Hurlbut, in turn, has recognized “changing public
needs that span several states” — particularly needs associated with electricity — and the
accompanying lack of legal institutions to meet these needs. See David J. Hurlbut, Multistate
Decisionmaking for Renewable Energy and Transmission: An Overview, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
677, 678 (2010).
45 See, e.g., Dan Tarlock, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Politi-
cal Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 91 (2010) (discussing the “general
lack of regional governance structures in our system”).
46 See generally W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14. R
47 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 41, at 716 (discussing how New Mexico preempts local R
authority over transmission siting).
48 See CLEAN AND DIVERSIFIED ENERGY INITIATIVE, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, SOLAR TASK
FORCE REPORT 19 (2006), available at http://www.westgov.org/component/joomdoc/doc_
download/96-solar.
49 See GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE COMPACTS (2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07519.pdf (describing the functions of the Dela-
ware River Basin Commission and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 321, 330, and 341. R
51 See infra text accompanying notes 281, 286-87 (describing the agency). R
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ponents of these and other regional institutions should inform the decision-
making structure for the development of renewable energy and broader
energy planning in America.
This Article identifies the anticommons and regulatory commons ele-
ments of utility-scale renewable energy development and then builds from
existing regional governing entities to propose a formal governance frame-
work to address these elements, as well as other energy challenges.  Specifi-
cally, it describes why a regional governance structure is necessary and
proposes a general structure that will best allow for steady development of
solar and wind farms while ensuring the representation of local, state, and
federal interests in the process of approving and guiding renewable develop-
ment.  It then describes why this regional model should be expanded to other
types of energy planning.
Part I explains why the development of utility-scale renewables is an
essential component of America’s transition toward a sustainable energy sys-
tem.  Part II describes why a regional institutional approach to renewables
development is necessary, applying Heller’s anticommons and Buzbee’s reg-
ulatory commons theories to renewable development.  Part III investigates
existing regional entities that have addressed similar issues, and Part IV
builds from these models, suggesting an ideal general structure for a regional
governance entity for renewables development (leaving for another day the
specific mechanics of this entity).  Finally, the Article concludes that a re-
gional approach must be quickly advanced within the energy field so that
essential experimentation with collaboration may begin.  America’s thirst for
energy continues to rise,52 and the energy crisis will not wait.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE-SCALE RENEWABLES
America’s energy challenges arise from a combination of growing fac-
tors, which this Part will describe.  First, demand for energy has steadily
grown and continues to rise, necessitating rapid development of energy re-
sources.  Second, the traditional fuels used to satiate this demand are nonre-
newable, meaning that they are not replenished in a human lifetime.53  In
rapidly extracting and burning these resources to meet the majority of
America’s energy demand, we are expending the capital of future genera-
tions,54 harming the environment and human health,55 and jeopardizing do-
52 See infra text accompanying note 58 (describing rising energy demand). R
53 See Valero et al., supra note 9, at 989. R
54 This concept was likely coined by Richard Buckminster “Bucky” Fuller, who argued
that fossil fuels are “nature’s own savings account, deposited in our ‘Earth bank’ and not to be
stolen by exploiters.  Everyone knows that we should live on our (energy) income and not our
savings account.  Nor should we burn our capital-account production equipment in order to
produce meter-marketable energy, for there will soon be no further production capability.” R.
BUCKMINSTER FULLER, CRITICAL PATH 223 (1981).
55 See NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, supra note 7. R
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mestic security.56  This Part will explain why renewable energy will be a
necessary component of the response to this energy crisis.
A. An Insatiable Thirst for Energy
Economic growth is directly correlated with energy consumption,57 and
as the United States has grown, we have installed air-conditioning systems,
built larger houses, watered more lawns and golf courses, driven more vehi-
cles, and plugged in ever more sophisticated electronic gadgets.  Total aver-
age U.S. energy consumption has more than doubled since 1950 to about 94
quadrillion British thermal units.58  To produce this somewhat unfathomable
quantity of energy, American companies operate more than 17,500 electric
generating units59 — including more than 1,400 coal, 100 nuclear, 5,400
natural gas, and 3,700 petroleum-burning units.60  We also produce and im-
port billions of gallons of fuels for primary energy consumption61 — fuel
burned to produce heat from a furnace or to run automobile engines, for
example.62  This trend, combined with current and projected population
numbers and average individual consumption of energy, suggests that de-
mand will continue to rise.63
In the meantime, global energy demand has also been shooting upward
as international economies grow.64  This, and the fact that the United States
imports approximately thirty percent of all of the energy that it consumes,65
56 See id. at 98 (describing the bipartisan energy commission’s security concerns related to
energy).
57 See Lewis, supra note 1, at 394. R
58 Numbers derived from EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 09, supra note 3, at 13. R
59 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, EXISTING ELECTRIC GENERATING
UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/capacity/
existingunits2008.xls (data compiled from Form EIA-860 Annual Electric Generator Report).
60 Id.
61 Value derived from EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 09, supra note 3, at 37 (showing a R
total of 56.4 quadrillion BTUs of consumption of fuels for non-electrical energy in 2009).
62 See, e.g., Use of Gasoline - Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.
eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=gasoline_use (last updated Sept. 30, 2010) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing that Americans consumed about 137
billion gallons of gasoline in 2009).
63 The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. total energy consump-
tion will rise by one half of one percent annually through 2035. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 56 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383%282010%29.pdf; see also Benjamin K. Sovacool & Kelly E. Sovacool,
Identifying Future Electricity-Water Tradeoffs in the United States, 37 ENERGY POL’Y. 2763,
2763 (2009) (stating that if Department of Energy projections are correct, “nationwide elec-
tricity demand” will double, from 2000 levels, before 2050).
64 In 1980, global consumption of energy (excluding the United States) was 205 quadril-
lion BTUs; by 2006, it had risen to 372 BTUs.  Numbers derived from U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, WORLD PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION (BTU), 1980–2006, TA-
BLE 1, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1.xls [hereinafter EIA,
WORLD CONSUMPTION].
65 Id. (showing U.S. energy consumption of 100 quadrillion BTUs in 2006); Jan. 2011
Monthly Energy Rev., Energy Exports by Source and Total Net Imports, U.S. ENERGY INFO
ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/mer/query/mer_data.asp?table=to1.04b (last visited May 20,
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means that other strong economies are increasingly competing for a substan-
tial portion of the energy sources that we seek out.66  In July 2010, China
officially surpassed the United States in energy consumption.67  Every coun-
try is a part of the energy crisis, and each must begin constructing
alternatives.
B. The Traditional Remedy: Rapid Consumption of
Nonrenewable Fuel Sources
As the world searches for a sustainable alternative to the current energy
pattern, fossil fuels will continue to be a dominant global energy source.68
But they will become more expensive and scarce, and producers will have to
rely upon more “unconventional” sources of these fuels — those that are
difficult to extract compared to traditional sources.69  As the Gulf oil spill
has graphically demonstrated, Americans may be increasingly uncomforta-
ble70 with the effects of unconventional fossil fuel extraction on human
health, the environment, and local economies.  A single oil spill in 2010
temporarily shut down a large portion of the southern fishing industry, re-
duced income from tourism, killed wildlife, and dirtied beaches.71  Offshore
oil should not be the only point of focus, however.  Other unconventional
extraction techniques have important environmental, economic, and health-
related externalities.
As conventional reserves become scarcer, energy production companies
have increasingly moved toward unconventional onshore sources of petro-
leum such as tar sands (also called oil sands72) and oil shales.  Tar sands “are
2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing net energy imports of 30 quad-
rillion BTUs in 2006).
66 Although U.S. consumption continues to rise, its consumption as a percentage of world
consumption has declined — from about 27% of global consumption in 1980 to about 21% in
2006. See EIA, WORLD CONSUMPTION, supra note 64, at tbl.1.
67 See Swartz & Oster, supra note 4. R
68 Certain fossil fuels will be scarce within a century, while others have a longer life span.
See, e.g., J.O. Jaber & S.D. Probert, Environmental-Impact Assessment for the Proposed Oil-
Shale Integrated Tri-Generation Plant, 62 APPLIED ENERGY 169, 170 (1999) (“The availability
of crude oil or natural gas can be measured in decades, whereas the identified readily-available
oil-shale reserves are sufficient to satisfy the world’s energy needs for several centuries.”).
69 See TED MCCALLISTER, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, IMPACT OF UN-
CONVENTIONAL GAS TECHNOLOGY IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2000 1 (2001), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/pdf/uncongas/pdf (explaining the “technical dif-
ficulties inherent in developing” unconventional fuel resources).
70 See, e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll: Wide Majority See Spill as ‘Disaster,’ N.Y. TIMES CAU-
CUS BLOG (May 27, 2010), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/poll-wide-major
ity-see-spill-as-disaster/?scp=2&sq=%22gulf%20oil%20spill%22%20and%20polls&st=cse
(on file with the Harvard Law School library) (citing a USA Today/Gallup poll, which showed
that a “broad majority” believed the Gulf Oil Spill to be a “disaster”).
71 See Campbell Robertson, In Gulf, Good News Is Taken With Grain of Salt, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2010, at A1 (discussing the sight of oil on mud flats and the many commercial fishing
waters along the Gulf Coast that had been closed to fishing as a result of the spill).
72 About Tar Sands, OIL SHALE AND TAR SANDS PROGRAMMATIC EIS INFO. CENTER, AR-
GONNE NAT’L LAB., http://ostseis.anl.gov/guide/tarsands/index.cfm (last visited May 20, 2011)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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a combination of clay, sand, water, and bitumen, a heavy black viscous
oil,”73 and they are a potentially lucrative source of energy.  It is estimated
that there are more reserves of oil in tar sands than in conventional oil reser-
voirs,74 and the Gulf spill “triggered a rush by Shell and other oil compa-
nies” to commence tar sands extraction operations “in Russia, Congo, and
even Madagascar” — building from existing “successful development” of
the tar sands in Canada.75  To reach the sands, open surface mining is typi-
cally required, and operators then use large quantities of energy and water to
extract the bitumen from the mined sands.76  Only about ten percent of the
mined sand is bitumen; the remaining ninety percent of mined material is
waste.77  The production of one barrel of crude oil from the sands consumes
two and a half to four barrels of water78 and between 500 and 1000 cubic
feet of natural gas.79  The tailings from the process are stored in “sludge
ponds” on the surface for many years.80
Oil shale, “a fine-grained sedimentary rock” that contains solid organic
matter in the form of kerogen,81 is another alternative to conventional oil and
is one of the most abundant remaining fossil fuel resources.82  Like tar sands,
oil shale requires energy- and land-intensive practices to be economically
extracted.  The most efficient means of obtaining the oil shale is surface
mining, such as open pit (strip) mining,83 and one of the common oil shale
extraction technologies is called “retorting,” wherein the shale is mined and
a chemical process heats up the shale to release “petroleum-like liquids.”84
73 Id. (emphasis omitted).
74 O.V. Abramov et al., Extraction of Bitumen, Crude Oil and its Products from Tar Sand
and Contaminated Sandy Soil Under Effect of Ultrasound, 16 ULTRASONICS SONOCHEMISTY
408, 408 (2008).
75 Nigel Williams, New Focus on Tar Sands, 20 CURRENT BIOLOGY R461, R461 (2010).
76 Yvon Theriault et al., The Effect of Chemical, Physical, and Enzymatic Treatments on
the Dewatering of Tar Sands Tailings, 74 FUEL 1404, 1404 (1995) (explaining that at one oil
sands extraction plant operating in Canada in the 1990s, 15 cubic meters of water were re-
quired to produce one cubic meter of synthetic crude oil from the bitumen).
77 Elizabeth Kolbert, Unconventional Crude, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 2007, at 46.
78 Canada’s Oil Sands: Opportunities and Challenges to 2015 – Questions and Answers,
CANADA NAT’L ENERGY BD., http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/lsnd/pprtntsnd
chllngs20152004/qapprtntsndchllngs20152004-eng.html (last visited May, 2010) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
79 See id.
80 Williams, supra note 75, at R461 (explaining that tailings remained in sludge ponds for R
more than a decade).
81 X.X. Han et al., Studies of the Effect of Retorting Factors on the Yield of Shale Oil for a
New Comprehensive Utilization Technology of Oil Shale, 86 APPLIED ENERGY 2381, 2381
(2009).
82 Estonia, Russia, and China are already using oil shales for energy production.  Jaber &
Probert, supra note 68, at 170.  The quantity and locations of production and use will likely R
expand in the future. See Han et al., supra note 81, at 2381 (explaining that oil shale in China R
will be “very significant for alleviating the pressure of petroleum supplies” and that “many
countries rich in oil shale resources” are investigating “means to produce and use shale oil”).
83 Jaber & Probert, supra note 68, at 178. R
84 Oil Shale & Tar Sands Programmatic EIS Information Center, About Oil Shale, AR-
GONNE NAT’L LAB., http://ostseis.anl.gov/guide/oilshale/ (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
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The retorting produces a waste product called shale char, which contains
“several toxic compounds.”85  The earth disturbances and potential surface
pollution resulting from mining, as well as the energy required for process-
ing and the waste generated, make unconventional oil resources such as tar
sands and oil shales problematic despite their abundance.
Coal, like unconventional oil, remains in abundant quantities world-
wide but has familiar effects.  Underground coal mining has steadily de-
clined since the mid-1900s, but the remaining operations still carry high
risks.  An underground methane explosion in a West Virginia coal mine
killed twenty-nine workers in 2010.86  Surface mountaintop removal opera-
tions have replaced much of the risky underground mining but produce their
own problems.  Huge machines now scrape away the soil and rocks that
form mountains and then fill valleys with the overburden.87  In 2009, EPA
announced that it would carefully scrutinize hundreds of mountaintop re-
moval “valley fill” permits, as it was concerned that the fill, which smothers
miles of mountain streams, was damaging water quality in violation of Clean
Water Act standards.88  The effects of burning coal are also potent; coal-fired
power plants release large quantities of air pollutants, including mercury,
into the air,89 and the ash that is scrubbed out of power plant stacks and held
in nearby surface impoundments contains “contaminants like mercury, cad-
mium, and arsenic.”90
Natural gas, in contrast to coal and oil, is a cleaner fossil fuel because it
emits fewer air pollutants (including greenhouse gases) when burned.91  But
both unconventional natural gas extraction techniques and burning natural
gas to produce energy also have impacts.  A common method of unconven-
tional natural gas production is a technique called hydraulic fracturing
(“fracing” or “fracking”).92  To frac a gas well, water mixed with sand and
small quantities of chemicals is injected at high pressure into a well and
85 Han et al., supra note 81, at 2381. R
86 Greg Bluestein & Vicki Smith, Mine Rescue Effort Turns to Recovery, MSNBC, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36183425/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
87 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Corps, 556 F.3d 177, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (describ-
ing surface coal mining operations).
88 See Juliet Eilperin, EPA to Scrutinize Permits for Mountaintop-Removal Mining, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at A13 (describing EPA’s announcement to more closely scrutinize the
permits and its reasons for doing so).
89 See K.S. Park et al., Emission and Speciation of Mercury from Various Combustion
Sources, 180 POWDER TECH. 151, 151 (2008) (describing “coal-fire power plants and incinera-
tors” as a “[m]ajor mercury source[ ] from human activity”).
90 Press Release, EPA, EPA Announces Plans to Regulate Coal Ash (May 4, 2010), availa-
ble at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/4ECA022F6F5C501185257719005DFB1B.
91 See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An “Event-
ful” Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 516 (2005–06) (describing the lower emissions of natural
gas).
92 See Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Drilling Tactic Unleashes a Trove of Natural Gas
— And a Backlash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, at A1 (noting that “[t]oday, the industry
estimates that 90% of all new gas wells are fractured”).
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forced out into the shale surrounding the well.93  A national study of the
effects of the injection of fluids and their storage and disposal is still in its
early stages,94 but several incidents suggest that this extraction technique
will not escape critique.  Residents in Pennsylvania towns sued hydraulic
fracturing operators in 2010, alleging that fracing had contaminated their
wells.95  The state’s environmental agency also assessed a hefty fine against
an operator after the company mistakenly caused several chemical spills at
the surface of a frac site and a water well exploded nearby.96  In Texas, urban
areas have experienced much of the fracing boom; more than 1,000 wells
have been drilled within Fort Worth alone, leading residents to question
whether fracing and related gas operations are safe.97
A final source of non-renewable energy, which is not a fossil fuel but
relies upon an exhaustible fuel resource, is nuclear power.  Nuclear power,
in addition to the fossil fuels described above, may be a necessary compo-
nent of America’s energy mix for the near future due to a lack of adequate
alternatives.98  In several respects, nuclear power is superior to fossil fuels.
It emits far less carbon than do fossil fuel-fired power plants,99 and scientists
argue that the energy contained within the earth’s nuclear fuels is “in a prac-
tical sense, limitless and thus able to supply the entire world primary energy
needs for at least this century.”100  The uranium fuel must be mined, how-
93 See GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL & ALL CONSULTING, MODERN SHALE GAS DE-
VELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 56 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.
gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009.pdf.
94 Press Release, EPA, EPA Initiates Hydraulic Fracturing Study: Agency Seeks Input
from Science Advisory Board (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/e77fdd4f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/ba591ee790c58d30852576ea004ee3ad!Op
enDocument (announcing that the EPA would “conduct a comprehensive research study” of
fracing and “the potential adverse impact” that fracing might have on “water quality and
public health”).
95 Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Residents Sue Gas Driller Over Polluted Wells, THE FULTON
COUNTY NEWS, Nov. 26, 2009, available at http://www.fultoncountynews.com/news/2009-11-
26/Police_Reports/Pa_Residents_Sue_Gas_Driller_Over_Polluted_Wells.html; Press Release,
Parker Waichman Alonso LLP, Together with Its Partner Law Firms, Files Suit Against South-
west Energy Production Company and Southwestern Energy Company on Behalf of Penn-
sylvania Families Who Have Had Water Supplies Fouled by Hydraulic Fracturing (Sept. 14,
2010), available at http://medhealth.tmcnet.com/news/2010/09/14/5007184.htm.
96 See Rubinkam, supra note 95. R
97 Asher Price, As Urban Gas Drilling Expands, So Do Health Concerns, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, June 13, 2010, at A1 (quoting Senator Wendy Davis, who stated that “there’s a
growing concern from individuals, especially those in densely populated [cities], about
whether (the drilling) is done safely”).
98 See, e.g., PRISM/MERGE Analyses 2009 Update, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, http://www.smartclimatepolicy.org/consumers/EPRI%20Prism_MERGE%20Analyses%
202009%20Update.pdf (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (showing nuclear power as a component of a future electricity sector with reduced
carbon emissions).
99 Ralph E.H. Sims et al., Carbon Emission and Mitigation Cost Comparisons Between
Fossil Fuel, Nuclear and Renewable Energy Sources for Electricity Generation, 31 ENERGY
POL. 1315, 1317 (2003) (“The life-cycle from nuclear power plants  [greenhouse gas] emis-
sions per unit of electricity are at least two orders of magnitude lower than those from fossil
fueled electricity generation and comparable to most renewables at near zero.”).
100 Lewis, supra note 1, at 396. R
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ever, and nuclear plants consume vast quantities of water.101  The plants also
produce radioactive waste, which does not break down quickly102 and cur-
rently lacks any permanent location for disposal in the United States.103
In sum, the unsustainable forms of energy, which America has tradi-
tionally relied upon, all present risks to human health and the environment.
These fuels are essential, at least in the short term; they continue to produce
affordable energy, and there are currently insufficient energy alternatives to
replace them.  But our reliance upon them must gradually decline.
C. Renewables as a Part of the Sustainable Energy Solution
Renewable energy — energy that is replenished on a human times-
cale104 — is a clean, lower-risk source of energy in comparison to fossil fuels
and nuclear energy.  In an earlier article,105 Garrick Pursley and I described
the benefits of renewables, and I do not repeat those in detail here.  In short,
aggressively optimistic writers have argued that there is plenty of sun and
wind to eventually meet global demand for energy.106  Less optimistic writ-
ers have suggested that a combination of approaches will be necessary, in-
cluding energy efficiency measures, renewables, nuclear, and continued
reliance upon fossil fuels.107  Regardless of the future scenario adopted,
renewables will play a substantial role.
Unlike fossil fuel sources, renewable fuels are abundant and replenish-
able; most also have near-zero lifecycle carbon emissions.108 The fuels are
101 See, e.g., Todd Woody, Nonprofit Group will Prod Companies to Report Their Water
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at B3 (explaining that “New York State denied a permit for
Entergy’s Indian Point nuclear power plant because of its enormous consumption of water”);
Sovacool & Sovacool, supra note 63, at 2764 (explaining that nuclear power plants use more R
water than any other thermodynamic plants).
102 The half life of uranium-235 is approximately 1 billion years.  Manfred Lenzen, Life
Cycle Energy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nuclear Energy: A Review, 49 ENERGY CON-
VERSION AND MGMT. 2178, 2179 (2008).
103 See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.
energy.gov/environment/ocrwm.htm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (discussing President Obama’s rejection of Yucca Mountain as a disposal fa-
cility for nuclear waste); Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Memorandum and Order, CLI-10-13, at
4 (Apr. 23, 2010) (discussing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s adjudication of the De-
partment of Energy’s motion to withdraw its request for authorization to construct a permanent
nuclear disposal site at Yucca Mountain).
104 See Valero et al., supra note 9, at 989. R
105 See Garrick Pursley & Hannah Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming
2011).
106 See Vasilis Fthenakis et al., The Technical, Geographical, and Economic Feasibility for
Solar Energy to Supply the Energy Needs of the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 387, 397 (2009) (argu-
ing that “[i]t is clearly feasible to replace the present fossil fuel energy infrastructure in the
US with solar power and other renewables”); Valero et al., supra note 9, at 992 (observing that R
the energy from sunlight that hits the earth is about “three thousand times more than the
present power needs of the whole world”).
107 See NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, supra note 7, at vii (labeling as a “myth” the R
argument that “energy independence can be readily achieved through conservation measures
and renewable energy sources alone”).
108 See Sims et al., supra note 99, at 202–03. R
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domestically available and thus reduce the need for any country to look be-
yond its borders for energy sources.  The United States has abundant solar
and wind resources, which serve as convenient complements.  The wind
rushing down through the Midwest wind corridor109 blows most powerfully
at night, while the sun that beats down on the Southwest110 is strongest at
noon.111  Renewables also have a smaller impact on human health and the
environment than do fossil fuels,112 and they can bolster local, state, and
national economies.  Manufacturing, installing, and maintaining renewable
equipment requires labor,113 and the leases for the land that will host the
equipment can have high pay-offs.114  The benefits of renewables will not be
adequately captured, however, without modifying the current governance
structure for the siting and construction of utility-scale renewable plants.
II. THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
The transition to a sustainable energy system will require increased reli-
ance on renewable technology, and implementation of this technology will
be necessary at two levels: first, the distributed level, where solar technology
is placed on the roofs of buildings or wind turbines are constructed in backy-
109 See Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, States and United States Wind Resource
Maps, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last vis-
ited June 30, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing the strongest
onshore wind resources as occurring in the Midwest and West).
110 See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., United States Photovoltaic Solar Resource:
Flat Plate Tilted at Latitude, available at http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map_pv_national_
hi-res.jpg (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing
the strongest solar photovoltaic resources in red in the Southwest region).
111 Matthew L. Wald, Storing Sunshine, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007 (explaining that “[i]n
many parts of the country, wind is strongest at night); Paul Denholm & Robert Margolis,
Evaluating the Limits of Solar Photovoltaics (PV) in Traditional Electric Power Systems, 35
ENERGY POL’Y 2852, 2854 (2007) (describing solar peak periods).
112 See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 105 (weighing the environmental benefits of R
renewables as compared to other sources).
113 See, e.g., Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard, STATE ENERGY CONSERVATION OFFICE,
http://www.seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re_rps-portfolio.htm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (explaining that the $1 billion invested in wind energy in
Texas has created jobs); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030:  INCREASING
WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 204 (July 2008), available at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/41869.pdf (estimating, as a result of various
models and scenarios assuming that twenty percent of electricity in the United States would
come from wind energy by 2030, that “[c]umulative economic activity from the construction
phase alone will reach more than $944 billion for direct, indirect, and induced activity in the
nation” and would “stimulate[ ] an annual average of more than 250,00 workers required for
employment.”).
114 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. AUTH., WIND ENERGY TOOLKIT 31,
available at http://www.powernaturally.org/Programs/Wind/Wind%20Energy%20Toolkit.pdf
(explaining that a school district in Madison, New York receives “approximately $30,000 each
year” in wind power payments and that the town of Fenner, New York is receiving approxi-
mately $150,000 each year for fifteen years).
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ards,115 and second, the utility-scale level, where arrays of solar equipment or
industrial-scale wind turbines are constructed over thousands of acres of
land116 to produce electricity in quantities similar to those generated by a
traditional power plant.  Distributed renewables are distinctly local and re-
quire governance by municipalities.117  With technical guidance, municipali-
ties can effectively govern and enable the siting of distributed renewables by
modifying their zoning and building codes.118  Utility-scale renewables or
renewable “farms,” on the other hand — which are the focus of this Article
— require a new form of governance structure because existing institutions
lack the necessary jurisdiction and geographical scope.  As this Part will
describe, the best sites for large arrays of renewable technology (called “re-
newable parcels”) often cross municipal and state boundaries and multiple
private property lines, as does the electricity transmission infrastructure that
transports electricity.  Even where renewable parcels do not cross bounda-
ries, several separate entities often have lease and ownership rights and regu-
latory responsibilities in the parcel.  Multiple parties therefore have a right to
exclude potential developers of renewable infrastructure from a proposed
site — whether through direct denial of a lease or indirect “exclusion”
through regulation — and this creates a problem with “anticommons” ele-
ments.  Furthermore, the several government entities with regulatory respon-
sibilities within each renewable parcel often lack a shared vision for the
parcel or a clear hierarchy that allows certain entities to take the lead in
ensuring efficient and effective development of the parcel.  This, in turn,
suggests that renewable parcels may also have “regulatory commons” ele-
ments.  This part addresses these attributes of renewable parcels and explains
why these attributes have tragic implications for renewable governance.
A. Defining the Anticommons
The property literature has traditionally recognized two forms of prop-
erty: private property and commons.  Private property is often viewed as a
bundle of core rights in property,119 such as the right of possession, the right
115 See Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of Environ-
mental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choices for Future Power Development, 19
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 139 (2009) (describing distributed renewables).
116 See, e.g., Fast-Track Renewable Energy Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BU-
REAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/ca/st/en/fo/cdd/alternative_energy/fast-trackfast
facts.html (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard law School Library) (describ-
ing renewable projects that require as many as 15,493 acres of land).
117 See generally Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 105. R
118 Many municipalities have already done so. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH
AND DEV. AUTH., WIND ENERGY MODEL ORDINANCE OPTIONS, 4 (2008), available at http://
www.powernaturally.org/programs/wind/toolkit/2_windenergymodel.pdf  (describing various
municipal zoning requirements for wind turbines); see also Pursley & Wiseman, supra note
105, (describing zoning and building codes that address renewable technologies). R
119 See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917,
933 (2010) (“It has long been conventional to describe property as a ‘bundle of rights.’”).
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to exclude, and the right to transfer possession when desired.120  Through the
bundle of rights possessed, the holder of private property may include select
persons and exclude others.  Any given piece of private property may have
multiple holders,121 and some of the rights within the bundle may have been
severed or modified;122 one individual may hold the rights to the minerals
beneath the land, for example, while a second may own the land, or a non-
owner may have an easement to drive over the property.  But the rights
within the bundle and the holders of each of those rights can still typically be
conveniently identified, and each owner has a clear and transferable exclu-
sion right.123
Commons, unlike private property, do not allow any owner to exclude
others by right.  In Garrett Hardin’s classic example, cattle herders all shared
access to a local pasture.124  Any herder could graze livestock there, and each
herder was incentivized to graze as much livestock as possible as often as
possible in order to raise a large herd of the fattest cattle.125  Yet no herder
could exclude other herders; because the herders lacked defined boundaries
of private ownership and had no right to construct fences around an individ-
ual plot, the pasture became an overused resource.  A collection of individu-
als, each trying to raise as many fat cattle as possible, led to tragedy.126
Beyond classic private ownership and the commons tragedy, Henry
Smith has introduced a third type of property - a hybrid of commons and
private property that he describes as a semicommons.  Semicommons in-
volve property that is both privately used for an important purpose and open
to multiple users for another important purpose.127  Smith identifies medieval
fields, where several large plots around a village were shared by peasants, as
a classic example of semicommons.  Within these fields, “peasants had pri-
vate property rights to the grain they grew on their individual strips of under
1 acre,” but “during certain seasons, peasants would be obligated to throw
the land open to all the landowners for grazing their animals (especially
sheep) in common.”128  Semicommons introduced costs — such as the diffi-
culty of monitoring legitimate and illegitimate uses129 — but Smith describes
120 See Heller, supra note 17, at 663 (describing A.M. Honore’s list of property’s “standard R
incidents”).
121 See Baron, supra note 119, at 933 (observing that “[t]here is widespread agreement
that . . . property rights in a single asset can be divided among people and divided over time”).
122 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An Explo-
ration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 657 (2008) (describing how servitudes allow
property owners to sever certain property rights).
123 Under Henry Smith’s view, property rights provide this information. See Henry E.
Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Content, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1147
(2003) (arguing that a property right sends informational signals to the “outside world”).
124 Hardin, supra note 24, at 1244. R
125 Id.
126 Id. (explaining that “[e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to increase
his herd without limit” and that “[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush”).
127 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131–32 (2000).
128 Id. at 132.
129 Id. at 144.
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how the individuals using the semicommons invented unique methods to
enhance the net benefits of this form of property.130
Within this array of property types we find Michael Heller’s anticom-
mons.  Heller’s anticommons may be viewed as a fourth form of property131
— a “property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of
exclusion in a scarce resource.”132  An anticommons emerges when one
owner holds one core right of a bundle of rights, such as possession, and “a
second owner holds the same or another core right in the object, and so on,
with no hierarchy among these owners’ rights or clear rules for conflict reso-
lution.”133  Owner A may own the right of “exclusive possession” of a prop-
erty, for example, while Owner B may also own the right of exclusive
possession of that property or alternatively, the core right of “personal use”
of the property.134  And neither owner has the ultimate say; the property re-
gime does not make clear that Owner A’s right of exclusive possession
trumps Owner B’s, or that Owner B may make personal use of the property
even if Owner A claims exclusive possession and the right to exclude.  In an
anticommons there are too many private property rights and too many own-
ers with the right to exclude; no matter how clear the rights are, the property
is underused.
Heller describes the anticommons as the “mirror image” of com-
mons,135 but one can also envision it as a former commons where too many
conflicting private property-type rights have been imposed.  Imagine Har-
din’s pasture where hundreds of herders graze their cattle and compete for
precious inches of grass.  Suddenly, a local government takes possession of
the pasture and decides to divide it into small parcels.  The government
fences each parcel and records the metes and bounds of each on paper.  It
then transfers possession of each parcel and its associated paper record to a
herder who has historically used the pasture, and the government keeps a
second copy of each record in a designated town office.  Each herder whose
cattle previously grazed freely on the pasture is now limited to a small
fenced parcel.  In doling out papers, however, the town has likely missed
some herders who previously used the pasture.  These herders now rush to
the town office, declaring that they, too, deserve a parcel and have a right to
use the parcel for grazing; they continue grazing their cattle, but the town
130 See id. at 144–54 (explaining, for example, that scattering privatized strips among pri-
vate property equalized the costs imposed on strips – such as trampling by the animals in the
commons – as well as the benefits of manure droppings for fertilizer).
131 But see infra text accompanying note 147 (arguing that anticommons are not a distinct R
form of property).
132 Heller, supra note 17, at 668 (emphasis omitted). But see Lee Anne Fennell, Common R
Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 909, 933 (2004) (placing anticommons problems
“within the family of common resource dilemmas” and arguing that both commons and an-
ticommons tragedies should be grouped within one taxonomy of “common interest
tragedies”).
133 Heller, supra note 17, at 670. R
134 Id. at 663.
135 Id. at 623.
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has no provisions for adverse possession.  Other herders who no longer wish
to raise cattle also run to the town office, demanding that they be allowed to
sell their land.  The town replies that the land may not be alienated and that
only heirs may inherit the parcel.  On top of this confusion, a higher level of
government weighs in, stating that even if herders own a parcel, they may
not graze cattle there until they obtain a certificate of grazing use from the
National Agricultural Council, a certificate of compliance from the National
Environmental Agency, and five other certificates from various regulators.
And finally, the highest level of government declares that it owns all leasing
rights to the parcel; if herders wish to temporarily allow another individual
to use the parcel, that individual must first obtain permission from the na-
tional government.
This imagined pasture is a classic example of an anticommons, and this
form of property is not mythical.  Heller describes how similar anticommons
emerged in post-Soviet Russia, for example, where the government priva-
tized formerly state-owned property by creating multiple private rights in
that property.  In Russian storefronts, at least four “owners” emerged in the
privatization of the 1990s.136  First, local government councils technically
owned storefronts and could sell or lease them, but the national government
retained more powerful ownership control, such as the ability to define an
acceptable price for the sale.  Second, workers’ collectives — bakers who
had been using the store for years, for example — remained as squatters.137
Third, entities called balance-sheet holders (somewhat analogous to trust-
ees), also had some exclusion power; they had certain rights to “use and
dispose of the property” within the storefront, sometimes as co-lessors.138
And finally, there were at least six different agencies, such as the city archi-
tect and a historic preservation office, which had to approve all storefront
leases.139
Beyond Russia, Heller provides examples of anticommons in traditional
market economies.  In Kobe, Japan, attempts to redevelop privately-owned
property were nearly impossible after an earthquake destroyed much of the
city.140  Flawed land use laws allowed a small piece of land to be divided
into thousands of parcels, and “renters, lessees, landowners, and subletters”
often had overlapping claims to buildings.141  One owner was able to block
any attempts at rebuilding, thus excluding the multiple other users and creat-
ing underuse of the property.  Yet another anticommons emerged in the
United States, when Congress divested tribal land held in federal trust to
Native American heads of household.142  The government prohibited aliena-
tion of this divested land, and due to the method of rights creation and inher-
136 Id. at 636.
137 Id. at 636–37.
138 Id. at 637.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 684.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 685–86.
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itance, the land was eventually divided among so many owners that in some
cases, profits from leases amounted to pennies per owner.143
Anticommons, as demonstrated by Heller’s examples, may arise in
states with or without market-based economies, and they need not involve
divesture of land; land use laws can independently create anticommons.  No
matter where or how they emerge, anticommons all have three factors in
common, which distinguish them from private property and commons.  First,
“multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion to a scarce resource.”144
Second, these owners’ rights allow them to “prevent other owners from ob-
taining a core bundle of rights in an object.”145  This means each owner can
block other owners from using the resource to its full potential.  And finally,
the objects within the anticommons may be difficult to alienate or use pro-
ductively, and the owners of the objects lack a “clear hierarchy of decision-
making authority.”146  Even if the owners wish to sort out their rights and
determine how to trade them in order to productively use the property, they
will have trouble identifying and working with the authorities who hold the
rights.
Scholars have critiqued Heller’s theory from several angles.  Some ar-
gue that anticommons are not in fact a unique type of property but are rather
simply a “manifestation of circumstances in which private property may be
misused or lead to undesirable outcomes.”147  Others have suggested that
anticommons identified by Heller do not empirically demonstrate full an-
ticommons characteristics.148  From the definitional standpoint, Heller him-
self concedes that “the difficult cases involve finding the boundary of viable
private ownership beyond which a tragedy of the anticommons is likely to
arise and persist,”149  but he believes that this line can be identified.  Heller
describes a true anticommons as a property resource for which “ownership
fragments do not function productively on an ordinary scale of use.”150  In
one of his strongest examples of an anticommons tragedy, the property inter-
ests “have become so fragmented that their economic value derives prima-
rily for their use in blocking others.”151  In other cases, fragmentation of
private property is beneficial and creates wealth, not an anticommons.152
143 Id. at 686.
144 Id. at 673.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Contemporary Property Law Scholarship: A Comment, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 97, 98 (2001).
148 See, e.g., Brian Sawers, Reevaluating the Evidence for Anticommons in Transition Rus-
sia, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 238 (2010) (arguing that factors other than an anticommons,
including “credit shortages, taxes, corruption, favor exchange practices, and organized crime”
create barriers to a thriving Russian retail system).
149 Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1198
(1999).
150 Id. at 1222.
151 See id. at 1221.
152 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE208.txt unknown Seq: 23  2-AUG-11 9:28
2011] Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance 499
With these critiques and definitional difficulties in mind, the following
subpart will argue that renewable parcels have strong anticommons qualities,
even if the parcels simply exemplify the occasional flaws of a private prop-
erty system153 and do not fit perfectly within an anticommons definition.
From the perspective of siting, the many fragments of an industry-scale re-
newable parcel do not “function productively”154 together.  While renewable
parcels do not likely rise to a level where the ownership interests are valua-
ble only in terms of the ability to block others from using the parcel, I sug-
gest that the productivity of parcels is substantially diminished due to
fragmented rights.  The parcels may not be true “anticommons,” in other
words (assuming that a clear definitional line for anticommons can be
drawn), but they exhibit important anticommons characteristics.
B. Renewable Parcels as Anticommons
Wind and sunlight are universally abundant resources, and some quan-
tity of these renewable fuels can be captured over every inch of the globe’s
surface.  But large-scale renewable development is only economical in re-
gions where wind and sunlight are strongest and where land uses beneath
fugitive wind and sunlight are amenable to technology construction.  In
other words, two parallel “estates” layered together — a fugitive and sur-
face estate — are required.  The technology to capture wind and sunlight
must be placed within an area that combines abundant fugitive resources and
an accessible surface, an area which this Article calls a “renewable parcel.”
The multiple entities who have use, ownership, and regulatory rights to land
within renewable parcels create a problem with anticommons qualities be-
cause each entity within the parcel has one or several exclusion rights.
The exclusion rights within a renewable parcel arise in several ways.
First, where a renewable parcel happens to cross multiple jurisdictional
boundaries and private property lines, this new, artificially-drawn parcel has
collected an array of rights holders.  This is, at its most basic level, a land
assembly problem.  But the collection of property within one new renewable
parcel also pulls together numerous rights to exclude, which do not always
emanate from the surface and therefore exhibit more than an assembly prob-
lem.  This is demonstrated by a second development scenario, which creates
a renewable anticommons when a development is proposed on one piece of
property that does not cross private or jurisdictional boundaries.  This second
type of parcel does not require any assembly of land, yet individual rights
holders can still block renewable development.  Entities within the renewa-
ble parcel without direct surface ownership rights could still impede the
grant of a wind lease (where rights to a severed fugitive wind estate are
153 See supra text accompanying note 147. R
154 Heller, supra note 149, at 1222. R
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recognized, for example,155 and a developer must lease the wind itself), ex-
isting holders of easements and mineral development rights could block the
use of the surface, and multiple regulatory authorities could deny required
permits.156
Regardless of the manner in which exclusion rights within a renewable
parcel emerge — whether through the assembly of a new parcel that crosses
jurisdictional and private property lines or through the acquisition of one
existing piece of property for renewable development — exclusion rights
present substantial impediments to developing the renewable parcel.  These
rights are held by the public and private owners of property within the parcel
who could simply refuse to lease the property or wind or block the use of
renewable technology.  A number of municipal, state, and federal agencies
also have opportunities to block the development through permitting
processes, which are themselves rights of exclusion.  Depending on the loca-
tion of the parcel, the developer may have to obtain an incidental take permit
under the Endangered Species Act, a permit under the Clean Water Act for
dredge and fill activities, a Clean Water Act stormwater permit for earth
disturbance activities, a hazard determination from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, a Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure Plan from the
EPA for potential fuel spilled on site (renewable plants require back-up gen-
erators), a permit under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, and an
authorization from the Bureau of Land Management or a permit from an-
other federal agency that owns the land.157
Additionally, the renewable power plant developer may have to obtain
a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the state’s public util-
ity commission,158 state water rights, certifications under various state envi-
ronmental statutes, a special use permit from one or several municipal
155 For a more in-depth discussion of severed wind rights and how these differ from tradi-
tional mineral rights (which, unlike severed wind rights, grant a developer automatic access to
reasonable use of the surface), see Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable
Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
156 Whether the exclusion rights within a renewable parcel arise from a grouping of multi-
ple properties and jurisdictions within one parcel (an assembly-type problem) or the existence
of multiple rights holders within one property is ultimately unimportant.  In Heller’s examples,
certain anticommons arise from the breaking of property into small pieces as a result of inheri-
tance, while others arise directly from regulation that recognizes too many types of rights
within one piece of property.  No matter the origin of these layered rights, the relevant an-
ticommons qualities arise after rights creation.
157 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND ENERGY SITING HANDBOOK 4-1 – 4-42 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.awea.org/sitinghandbook/downloads/Chapter_4_Regulatory_Framework.
pdf.
158 See, e.g., 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-115 (West 2010) (“Any alternative retail
electric supplier must obtain a certificate of service authority from the Commission . . . before
serving any retail customer or other user located in this State.”); GREAT LAKES WIND COLLAB-
ORATIVE, GREAT LAKES COMM., STATE AND PROVINCIAL LAND-BASED WIND FARM SITING
POLICY IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION:  SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 3 (2010), available at http://
www.glc.org/energy/wind/pdf/GLWC-LandBasedSiting-Jan2010.pdf (explaining  that most of
the states in the Great Lakes region require wind facilities to “demonstrate consumer need for
the electricity to be generated and receive a certificate of need from the appropriate regulatory
authority”).
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zoning authorities, and construction approval from local airports.159  Finally,
a renewable developer must obtain permission from a transmission line
owner to interconnect to the grid, which requires a series of tests to prove
that the grid will be able to accommodate the new input of electricity.160  A
denial of any one of these permits or authorizations could block the project.
As an example of these layered exclusion rights, California is currently
experiencing a surge in proposals for large solar plants.161  One of the pro-
posed solar plants in the early stages of review in California will require
more than ten square miles of land (6,500 acres),162 portions of which in-
clude private property and Bureau of Land Management acreage.163  A pro-
posed wind project in California, described in the introduction, similarly
involves 15,500 acres of BLM, Native American, state, and private lands.164
The Bureau of Land Management must authorize projects based on the prep-
aration of an Environmental Impact Statement, determinations under the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act and Endangered Species Act, and
consultations with Native American tribes.165  Ultimately, the BLM could
block the project by refusing authorization.  In addition, the developer may
not commence construction of a solar plant until it has complied with local
airports’ land use plans, towns’ general plans for land use, and municipal and
county codes.166  A similar array of laws will apply in most other states,
159 See Cal. Energy Comm’n, Victorville 2 Hybrid Power Project, Final Commission Deci-
sion A-14-15 (July 2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-800-
2008-003/CEC-800-2008-003-CMF.PDF (requiring the Victorville solar/natural gas plant to
comply with the San Bernardino County General Plan, the San Bernardino County Develop-
ment Code, the City of Victorville General Plan, the City of Victorville Municipal Code, City
of Hesperia Municipal Code, and the Southern California Logistics Airport Specific Plan).
160 For a more lengthy discussion of the multiple steps and permissions required for a
renewable developer to site, construct, and begin operating a utility-scale renewable plant, see
Wiseman et al., supra note 155. R
161 See Large Solar Energy Projects, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/
siting/solar/index.html (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (“Many large solar energy projects are being proposed in California’s desert area on
federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land.”).
162 U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. AND CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, SES SOLAR TWO PROJECT:
STAFF ASSESSMENT AND DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND DRAFT CALIFORNIA
DESERT CONSERVATION AREA PLAN AMENDMENT ES-1 (2010), available at http://www.
energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-700-2010-002/CEC-700-2010-002-SA-DEIS.PDF.
163 Id. at ES-2.
164 See supra text accompanying note 32. R
165 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of
Land Mgmt. Cal. Desert Dist. and the Cal. Energy Comm. Staff Concerning Joint Environmen-
tal Review for Solar Thermal Power Plant Projects 1 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://www.
energy.ca.gov/siting/solar/BLM_CEC_MOU.PDF.
166 See Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 159 (requiring the Victorville solar/natural gas R
plant to comply with the San Bernardino County General Plan, the San Bernardino County
Development Code, the City of Victorville General Plan, the City of Victorville Municipal
Code, City of Hesperia Municipal Code, and the Southern California Logistics Airport Spe-
cific Plan). Cf. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25514(a)(2) (West 2010) (requiring the Energy Com-
mission, in its final report on site certification, to include “[a]pplicable local, regional, state,
and federal standards, ordinances, and laws, including any long-range land use plans or guide-
lines adopted by the state or by any local or regional planning agency, which would be applica-
ble but for the exclusive authority of the commission to certify sites and related facilities” (for
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where streamlined permitting processes have not been implemented for re-
newable development.167
A developer attempting to build on a renewable parcel that crosses sev-
eral municipal boundaries will face even more layers of regulation in most
states.168  The town of Cohocton, New York, for example, prohibits wind
turbines higher than 500 feet,169 while the neighboring town of Springwater
sets a height limit of 400 feet for commercial turbines.170  Cohocton requires
that an industrial windmill be set back one-hundred feet “plus the maximum
structure height” from the property line — a setback of 500 feet if 400-foot
tall turbines were installed.171  Springwater, on the other hand, requires that
the turbine be one and one-half times its height from the property line —
600 feet from the property line for the same turbine height.172  Cohocton
requires that the developer post a bond in an amount sufficient to remove the
windmill,173 while Springwater requires a bond in an amount “no less than
125% of the cost of the removal of the tower and restoration of the site and
roadways.”174
Conflicting regulations are not themselves exclusion rights but rather
inconvenient barriers to a developer.  Municipalities and private property
owners, however, also have the explicit power to exclude a developer from a
renewable parcel.  The largest wind farm on the East Coast, for example,
covers four New York towns and numerous farming plots,175 and town offi-
cials and residents could have blocked the proposed development through
several venues.  One landowner reneged on a wind lease, and town officials
thermal facilities)); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 2010); (preempting all local authority
over siting); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25502 (West 2010) (only requiring developers proposing
the construction of thermal power plants and power lines to apply for a site certificate).  Wind
farms and solar photovoltaic plants are not thermal plants (they do not heat up water to turn a
turbine) and thus do not receive siting certificates from the California Energy Commission.
For a more detailed discussion of states that preempt local authority over power plant siting –
including the siting of renewables, see Wiseman et al., supra note 155. R
167 See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 157, at 4-41 (explaining that “[a]t R
most proposed wind energy project sites, one or more local approvals will be required”); id. at
4-35. (explaining that Kansas vests all siting authority in local governments); Katherine Dan-
iels, One Community’s Experience with Wind Development: An Interview with Richard J. Gra-
ham, Esq., N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. AUTH. 1–3, http://www.powernaturally.
org/Programs/Wind/toolkit/donovaneditsdanielsNYSERDAwindinterview2grahamcomments
accept.pdf (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (explain-
ing how the county and towns worked together in determining acceptable terms for the lease
and in determining whether they would accept the project).
168 See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind:
New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2009) (ex-
plaining that “in many states, local zoning authorities are primarily responsible for approving
and siting wind farms and other energy facilities”).
169 Cohocton, N.Y., Windmill Local Law § II (C)(1) (2006), available at http://www.
gflrpc.org/programareas/wind/LL/CohoctonWindmillLaw.pdf.
170 Springwater, N.Y., Local Law No. 1, Wind Energy Conversion Systems § 2(3)(H)(2)
(2006), available at http://www.gflrpc.org/programareas/wind/LL/Springwater_WECS.pdf.
171 Cohocton, N.Y. Windmill Local Law § II (B)(1)(a) (2006).
172 Springwater, N.Y. Wind Energy Conversion System § 2(3)(C), (2006).
173 Cohocton, N.Y. Windmill Local Law § II (F)(4) (2006).
174 Springwater, N.Y. Wind Energy Conversion System § 2(3)(J)(2) (2006).
175 Daniels, supra note 167, at 1. R
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initially rejected the lease payment plan proposed by the developer.176  None
of the four towns underlying the renewable parcel initially had zoning laws
that expressly permitted wind development when the project was first pro-
posed;177 each town eventually revised its code to allow wind development
but required the developer to first complete a site plan review and receive a
special use permit.178  Further, the law for the proper building inspection of
the site was unclear.  Town officials first insisted on reviewing safety
through a typical building inspection under New York’s Uniform Fire and
Building Code, but they eventually reached an agreement with the developer
to accept certificates of completion from contractors as evidence of satisfac-
tory construction.179  This complex zoning and permitting process lagged on
for approximately six years before a turbine was finally operational.180
Some renewable parcels also cross state borders, thus increasing the
potential for conflicting regulations and rights of exclusion within a given
parcel. A map prepared by the Western Governors’ Association and the De-
partment of Energy suggests that more than half of the best western areas for
renewable development lie over the borders of two or three states.181  Ac-
cording to this map, the ideal parcel for a solar developer, for example, may
plausibly lie directly over the intersection of southwest New Mexico and
southeast Arizona, or eastern California and western Arizona.182  There is
also evidence that trans-state renewable projects are not only hypothetical;
the aptly named “Stateline” wind farm, which has 300 megawatts of capac-
ity, is located in Umatilla County, Oregon, and Walla Walla County, Wash-
ington.183  The renewable developer of this type of parcel must obtain
multiple permits from several states and municipalities, whose requirements
for permit approval may differ substantially.  In some cases, the developer
will have to conduct several lengthy environmental reviews, each for a dif-
ferent state.184
176 Id. at 1–2, 5.
177 Id. at 4 (explaining that none of the towns had “land use regulations to allow wind
energy facilities”).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 5.
180 Id.
181 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY , supra note 14, at 13 (showing more R
than fifteen “Qualified Resource Areas” that fall over the borders of two or three states).  To
identify Qualified Resource Areas, or QRAs, the Western Governors’ Association first mapped
out the areas of the Western United States, Canada, and Northern Mexico with the highest
incident solar radiation and wind velocity.  It then modified these areas based on statutory and
regulatory limitations and geographic limitations within these areas that would make develop-
ment of renewable technology difficult or impossible. Id. at 6–11.
182 Id. at 12.
183 NextEra Energy Resources Portfolio Type — Fuel Type, NEXTER ENERGY Resources,
Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.nexteraenergyresources.com/content/where/portfolio/pdf/portfolio_
by_fuel.pdf (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
184 Washington State, for example, has a State Environmental Policy Act, which requires
all branches of government considering a proposed development to prepare detailed statements
about the environmental impacts of the proposed action and possible alternatives. See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §43.21C.030 (a)-(d) (West 2010).  California requires a similar analysis
under its California Environmental Quality Act. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.1 (West
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The property regime of a renewable parcel, with its many layered pri-
vate, municipal, state, and federal rights and regulations, appears to match,
to some degree, all three of Heller’s characteristics for an anticommons.
First, the myriad property owners within the proposed parcel — ranchers,
farmers, Native American tribes, homeowners, the federal government, and
states — ensure that “multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion to a
scarce resource.”185  Where renewable parcels are imposed upon an existing
map of private property lines and jurisdictional boundaries, creating an ap-
parent assembly problem, multiple parties within the parcel hold effective
rights to exclude.  Beyond merely assembling the land, the developer must
also contend with multiple jurisdictional directives.  Where a renewable de-
velopment is proposed on property owned by one individual within one ju-
risdiction, regulatory methods of exclusion remain at the local, state, and
federal permitting levels; various private rights holders also hold rights in
the form of mineral development interests, ownership of the wind itself, or
private use rights.  These exclusion rights are problematic in the renewables
context because renewable parcels are also scarce; not all areas within a
given region, state, or municipality have adequate resources for efficient re-
newable development.  Even those areas with strong sunlight and wind often
have existing conflicting land uses that prevent such development.186 Exclu-
sion rights to scarce resources can therefore stifle efficient development.
Second, the multiple owners’ rights within a scarce renewable parcel
allow these owners to “prevent other owners from obtaining a core bundle
of rights in an object . . . .”187  Where a renewable parcel crosses jurisdic-
tional lines, if one municipality wished to accept a lease offer from a wind
developer, a neighboring municipality within the proposed renewable parcel
could block the proposed development through zoning.  Further, the Fish
and Wildlife Service could deny the development on the grounds that it
would unlawfully take a species within the municipality;188 the BLM — if
there is federal land involved — could refuse to authorize the project based
on environmental or cultural concerns;189 and state agencies could deny nec-
2010) (requiring an environmental impact report or negative declaration).  A federal environ-
mental impact statement must also be completed for proposed developments on Bureau of
Land Management and other federal lands under the National Environmental Policy Act. See,
e.g., Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Tule
Wind Project and the Proposed East County Substation Project, San Diego, CA, 74 Fed. Reg.
68860 (Dec. 29, 2009) (describing the required environmental impact statement).
185 Heller, supra note 17, at 673. R
186 See, e.g., W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 11 R
(describing the land use limitations that modified the initial areas identified for the most eco-
nomical development of renewables).
187 Heller, supra note 17, at 673. R
188 See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLE ACTION TEAM, MILESTONES TO PERMIT
CALIFORNIA RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS ENERGY PROJECTS BY DECEMBER 3 (2010),
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/33by2020/documents/2009-10-15_Milestones_REAT.
PDF (describing obtaining an incidental take project as a “key milestone” for solar projects).
189 See, e.g., Questions and Answers on BLM’s Directive on Sage-grouse Management,
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/sage_grouse_conser
vation/sage-grouse_FAQ.html (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
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essary environmental permits.  Even a renewable parcel superimposed upon
one piece of private property within one jurisdiction contains multiple rights
holders that may prevent acquisition of an adequate rights bundle.  The
transmission line authority could deny a request to interconnect to the grid,
the owner of the wind rights (where they exist) could block the right to lease
the fugitive resource, the municipality could refuse to issue a rezoning or
variance for the turbines, and multiple state and federal agencies could deny
required permits.
Most importantly from the perspective of the anticommons, these com-
peting owners also lack a “clear hierarchy of decisionmaking authority.”190
No rights owners may force others to give up a right to exclude.  States
could legislatively declare authority over local land use decisions for renew-
ables and thus could remove the municipal right to exclude (as some have
done),191 but many have left nearly exclusive land use authority to munici-
palities.192  A state could therefore grant an environmental certificate for a
renewable power plant, for example, but the municipality could refuse to
authorize construction on the proposed site.  There would be no clear hierar-
chy to resolve the conflicting assertions of rights.  Partially due to this lack
of hierarchical authority, as well as the many owners of rights within a re-
newable parcel, the objects within the parcel may be difficult to alienate or
use productively.  Commercial operation of the East Coast’s largest wind
farm began in 2006;193 the permitting and leasing process began seven years
earlier.194
Ultimately, renewable parcels may be better described as “complicated
collections of rights” than as an anticommons.  But perhaps this could be
true of any property claimed to have anticommons qualities.  In a Russian
storefront in the 1990s, one entity had to approve the lease, another had to
School Library) (describing how the BLM might deny a proposed traditional or renewable
energy development due to interference with sage-grouse habitat).
190 Heller, supra note 17, at 673. R
191 See infra notes 385–86 and accompanying text (describing preemption of local author- R
ity in California and Minnesota).
192 See, e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-12020 (West 2010) (“A county may establish
standards for wind farms and electric-generating wind devices.”); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-13-26 (West 2010) (“A municipality may regulate wind farms and electric-generating
wind devices within its zoning jurisdiction and within the 1.5 mile radius surrounding its zon-
ing jurisdiction.”); KAN. ENERGY COUNCIL, WIND ENERGY SITING HANDBOOK: GUIDELINE OP-
TIONS FOR KANSAS CITIES AND COUNTIES 2 (Apr. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he authority to
regulate land use in Kansas is under the purview of local governments” and describing four
Kansas counties’ wind energy regulations); supra notes 169–74 (describing New York towns’ R
varied ordinances addressing wind turbines); GREAT LAKES WIND COLLABORATIVE, supra note
158, at 6 (explaining that in Indiana, “[s]iting and permits for wind development are handled R
entirely at the local level”).
193 Maple Ridge Wind Farm, HORIZON WIND ENERGY, http://www.horizonwind.com/proj
ects/whatwevedone/mapleridge/ (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (explaining that commercial operation of the wind turbines on the farm began
in 2006).
194 Daniels, supra note 167, at 1 (explaining that in 1999, Horizon began “meeting with R
local officials and school districts” to discuss the proposed development and leasing and pay-
ment options).
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approve the price of the good sold, a third claimed use rights to the store,
and multiple government agencies could deny permits.  Under one view this
storefront exemplifies complicated, layered rights to one piece of quasi-pri-
vate property rather than an embodiment of a unique property form.  Regard-
less of the label chosen, the more exclusion rights that exist within one
property, and the less hierarchical organization there is among these rights,
the more difficult development becomes.  This is the case for Russian
storefronts, renewable parcels, and many other forms of property.
C. Renewable Parcels as Regulatory Commons
One must look beyond the exclusion rights to a renewable parcel to
understand the depth of the challenge to renewable energy development.  In
2003, William Buzbee noted that when the overuse or underuse of a resource
is observed, few tend to notice a corresponding regulatory problem that can
emerge in the form of the regulatory commons.195  A regulatory commons is
a regulatory environment in which no one government entity controls the
policy realm or has sufficient incentive to lead it.  Within this commons,
“social ills match no particular political-legal regime or jurisdiction, but in-
stead encounter fragmented political-legal structures”;196 there is a “mis-
match of underlying resources and government jurisdiction.”197 William
Buzbee introduced the concept of the regulatory commons in response to
Heller’s anticommons198 and suggested that regardless of whether a resource
is over- or under-used, the regulatory context surrounding that resource
sometimes creates a commons problem, resulting in regulatory gaps.
The regulatory commons differs from an anticommons in several re-
spects.  First, it focuses on the governance framework that overlies a re-
source; whereas an anticommons may result in underinvestment in a
resource itself, the regulatory commons involves underinvestment in regula-
tory opportunities to address a problem related to the resource — a problem
that often has multijurisdictional effects.  Second, while the anticommons
theory views regulations as one of the many types of exclusion rights within
one parcel — rights that cause underuse — the regulatory commons theory
sees the regulations (or lack thereof) as problematic because they lead to
some other bad result — pollution and sprawl, for example.  In the case of
renewables, both anticommons and regulatory commons happen to lead to
the same bad result.  The layered and sometimes competing private use
rights and regulations within one parcel could lead to underuse of the parcel.
Furthermore, these same regulations, which often emanate from multiple ju-
risdictions, create an appearance of overregulation but in fact may miss the
boat entirely.  With each jurisdiction addressing different aspects of the pro-
195 Buzbee, supra note 18, at 4–5. R
196 Id. at 6.
197 Id. at 7.
198 See id. at 6 (describing the regulatory commons as the converse of Hellers’s
anticommons).
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ject — or the same aspects of the project in conflicting ways — certain
guidance to the developer may be omitted entirely.  No one government,
however, takes the lead to collect these regulations, create clearer guidance,
and reduce transaction costs — guidance which could better enable renewa-
ble development and also ensure that the development is comprehensively
governed to protect the public interest.
Buzbee provides three examples of regulatory commons, including
aquaculture, urban sprawl, and global climate change.199  In the cases of both
aquaculture and urban sprawl, the underlying resource in question is not a
commons.  Through aquaculture, producers of fish have avoided the com-
mons resource problem by privatizing the fishery resource and raising their
own varieties of fish in individual ponds or fenced off portions of the
ocean.200  While this averts the classic commons tragedy, it has negative ef-
fects beyond the fishery fences.  Bioengineered fish may escape into sur-
rounding environments, for example, and the pollution from fish farms may
have widespread impacts.201  Yet no one institution has primary jurisdiction
over aquaculture.202
Urban sprawl involves a similarly local activity with widespread ef-
fects.  Homeowners within individual localities create this problem by mov-
ing toward the urban fringe.203  As a result of this movement toward the
suburbs, more roads must be built to accommodate the exiting masses,
newly-constructed houses break up ecosystems, and the urban core suf-
fers.204  Although individual municipalities could partially remedy this prob-
lem through zoning, they do not always have control over or the incentive to
curb its regional effects, and few states have taken up the charge.205
A third type of regulatory commons emerges from a classic commons
situation — climate change206 — but has unique problems that extend be-
yond the commons resource.  In the case of climate change, the atmosphere
is a physical commons.  Individuals may emit unlimited quantities of green-
house gases into the atmosphere and may not exclude others from doing so;
the result may be tragedy for all, in the form of rising temperatures and seas,
increased rates of disease, and more severe storms.207  As with all commons,
regulation is needed to address these adverse effects.  Property rights could
be allocated in the form of a cap and trade system, for example, but no one
government is “logically situated to take the lead and address global warm-
ing’s causes and anticipated harms.”208  Several nations and even states have
taken piecemeal approaches to the problem, but none have come close to
199 Id. at 12.
200 Id. at 8.
201 Id. at 8–9.
202 Id. at 9.
203 See id. at 10.
204 Id.
205 See id. at 10.
206 Id. at 11.
207 Id. at 12.
208 Id. at 13.
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solving it.  In Buzbee’s words, within a regulatory commons, there may be
“a lot of regulation” of a resource, but this does not mean that there is “too
much regulation.”209  The multi-jurisdictional half-solutions to one compo-
nent of the resource problem may falsely create an illusion of overregula-
tion, while in fact there remain significant regulatory gaps.
Renewable development could, in several respects, emerge as a fourth
example of a regulatory commons.  The underlying resource has anticom-
mons qualities: numerous rights to exclude developers from the physical re-
newable parcel lead to underinvestment in this resource.  But these
numerous rights to exclude can also create a regulatory conundrum: there is
not always an “obvious political-legal regime with regulatory primacy over
them.”210  As described above, municipal, state, tribal, and federal govern-
ments, as well as private property owners, may all have some rights to the
parcel, some of which overlap.  But renewable developments — like Buz-
bee’s urban sprawl, aquaculture, and climate change — have impacts within
and beyond their physical borders, and the multiple governments with rights
to exclude developers from a renewable parcel do not always have the juris-
diction or the incentive to control these impacts.
In the case of renewable development, the social ill that is mismatched
with the political-legal regime could be viewed as the underdevelopment of
renewables due to siting difficulties (and the attendant ills of energy depen-
dence and climate change, among others).  In this scenario, the many gov-
ernments with slices of jurisdiction over renewable parcels may have
inadequate incentives to fix the social ill for at least three reasons.  First,
“numerous regulators could be blamed for the ill,” in that no one regulator
may be “perceived as the institution most responsible for a problem or its
correction.”211  Indeed, many towns have failed to enact zoning or building
codes that recognize renewables, while the towns’ home states similarly lack
regulations for renewable siting;212 the institution responsible for impeding
renewable development in this situation is not entirely clear.  Second, if one
government institution were to fix the underdevelopment problem, other in-
stitutions might enact competing or even conflicting solutions and take
credit for this move.213  In a state where renewable siting policy is left prima-
rily to municipalities, towns could enact various zoning codes, only to later
be preempted by the state or to find that their code directly conflicted with
that of neighboring towns, where a development was proposed.  Finally,
governments may prefer the status quo of layered and sometimes conflicting
209 Id. at 7.
210 Id. at 23.
211 Id. at 31.
212 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 167 (describing New York towns’ failure to R
address renewables in their code).  New York does, however, provide some guidance as to
potential content for local codes. See New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, Wind Energy Model Ordinance Options (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.
powernaturally.org/programs/wind/toolkit/2_windenergymodel.pdf.
213 Buzbee, supra note 18, at 32–33. R
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regulation of renewable development.214  With respect to renewables, for ex-
ample, a state may not want to take away municipalities’ authority over sit-
ing — even if that authority conflicts — and the states and municipalities
may be fearful of limiting in any respect the strong property rights of private
owners.  All of these failures could lead to a regulatory commons, where the
many institutions with partial jurisdiction to fix the social ill may lack the
adequate incentives to address it.
Alternatively, or additionally, the social ill that may be mismatched
with the legal regime for renewables could be analogized to urban sprawl.
While conflicting regulations and a lack of primary jurisdiction over some
aspects of renewable development can lead to underdevelopment, this regu-
latory morass can also fail to address legitimate public concerns surrounding
renewable development, including land use and environmental impacts,
among others.
D. The Tragedy of Renewable Governance
Renewable parcels’ regulatory commons and anticommons-type quali-
ties are not all tragic.  Renewable developments require large infrastructural
decisions that should not be made lightly.  Regulation is essential in the
renewables field to address safety concerns, visual and noise effects,215 water
use,216 habitat disruption,217 and local economic impacts, among other ef-
fects.  In separate pieces, Sara Bronin and Uma Outka have described the
potential land use impacts of renewables, including “energy sprawl”218 and
the associated possibility of “severe” land impacts.219  Although other en-
ergy technologies — including nonrenewables — also have a large land
footprint,220 these effects should not be ignored in the renewables area.
Outka has also highlighted the importance of effectively planning for and
mitigating the land and wildlife impacts of renewable development through
214 See id. at 33–34.
215 See Theocharis Tsoutsos et al., Environmental Impacts from the Solar Energy Technol-
ogies, 33 ENERGY POL. 289, 290 (2005) (referencing the visual effects of solar panels, as well
as noise effects during the construction or demolition process); Leda-Ioanna Tegou et al., Envi-
ronmental Management Framework for Wind Farm Siting: Methodology & Case Study, 91 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 2134, 2134 (referencing visual and noise effects of wind farms).
216 See Todd Woody, Alternative Energy Projects Stumble on a Need for Water, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 29, 2009, at B1 (explaining that renewable energy can sometimes “depend on a
huge amount of water”).  Solar thermal plants, for example, heat up a substance, which is then
used to boil water and turn a turbine to produce electricity. PAUL BREEZE, POWER GENERA-
TION TECHNOLOGIES 190 (2005).
217 See infra note 415. R
218 Sara Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl, 43 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
219 Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 9).
220 See id. at 8 (citing Robert McDonald, et. al., Energy Sprawl and Energy Efficiency:
Climate Policy Impacts on Natural Habitat for the United States of America, PLOS ONE 4(8):
e6802 (2009)) (describing a Nature Conservancy study that found biomass to have the largest
“land footprint,” followed by wind, hydropower, petroleum, and solar photovoltaics and the
next four highest consumers of land).
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governmental action by, for example, encouraging the development of
renewables on “brownfields” (polluted lands) and existing infrastructure as
well as comprehensively considering impacts in the siting process.221  In-
deed, complex regulation can be beneficial in many cases and is necessary
for safe and effective renewable development.  As Heller points out, a subdi-
vision where all property owners have agreed to restrictive covenants is an
anticommons,222 but it may benefit the community.  Some of the negative
traits of anticommons and regulatory commons, however, must be avoided
in the renewables realm; regulation should continue, but the many exclusion
rights contained within the regulations should be combined and streamlined
into a manageable package.  Without this governance change, too little de-
velopment on renewable parcels will occur.
The current governance system allows too little renewable development
because property with anticommons-type qualities creates high transaction
costs.  In Heller’s privatized Soviet storefront example, an individual want-
ing to lease the store and sell goods from it might have to bribe officials or
hire someone to identify the multiple individuals who control permits and to
sort out their rights.223  The transaction costs do not rise to this level in the
renewables realm, but they are still quite high.  Because “[t]he process for
obtaining a . . . siting permit varies not only between states, but also within
each state,”224 a developer must identify the numerous permits to be obtained
from municipal, state, and federal officials, and the environmental, cultural,
and historic reviews that must first be completed.  Then, the developer must
determine the correct officials to work with and participate in a number of
public hearings as part of the permitting process.  As the American Wind
Energy Association directs developers: “Early in project development, it is
important to conduct a detailed analysis of the potential permits, approvals,
and consultations that might apply to a wind project.”225
In some cases, overcoming the transaction costs necessary to identify
the many rights holders in a renewable parcel and the required siting and
development permits is not enough, thus compounding the tragedy; one
owner with rights to the parcels may effectively block all development.  In
Texas, for example, the state’s electric reliability agency identified Gillespie
County as one of the top twenty-five areas for wind development. In re-
sponse, the four county commissioners passed a resolution opposed to “the
construction and installation of industrial wind farms in Gillespie County
and the surrounding Hill Country area.”226  Towns around the country have
221 See generally id.
222 Heller, supra note 17, at 666. R
223 Id. at 643.
224 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 168, at 1065. R
225 AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 157, at 4-1. R
226 County Commissioners Say No to Wind Farms, FREDERICKSBURG STANDARD, Dec. 27,
2007, available at http://www.fredericksburgstandard.com/articles/2007/12/27/news/03news.
txt.
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similarly placed moratoria227 or bans228 on wind development and have
blocked proposed projects.  The transaction costs of renewable development,
as well as the ability for rights owners to trump the wishes of other owners
within renewable parcels, have contributed to underuse of some of the best
areas for renewable development.
Further, the numerous fragmented governance structures that apply to
renewable parcels appear at first sight to overregulate renewable develop-
ment; the many federal, state, municipal, and tribal rules and rights that ap-
ply seem to provide an abundance of guidance to renewables developers,
thus enabling siting.  But they sometimes leave regulatory gaps229 and pro-
vide insufficient or conflicting guidance, thus failing to provide a compre-
hensive siting regime.  The many layers of regulation that apply to siting
sometimes miss aspects of siting regulation altogether — such as guidance
on equipment specifications required by building codes230 — and they fur-
ther contribute to the underdevelopment problem. Renewable parcels there-
fore face a regulatory commons problem, wherein government agencies
have failed to take the helm in collecting rights and filling regulatory gaps in
the renewables arena.  Perhaps due to a lack of adequate incentive to address
the underdevelopment problem, only a few states have chosen to systema-
tize, collect, or preempt local regulation of aspects of renewable siting, for
example, and thus have failed to create a comprehensive statewide system
for renewable siting.231  While streamlining is not the only method of avoid-
ing the tragedy of the regulatory commons, this type of consolidated system
would fill regulatory gaps by providing uniform zoning and building code
provisions or requiring consistent environmental review.  In many cases, this
type of consolidation and gap filling has not occurred where needed.
E. Transmission Assurance: A Final Challenge Necessitating
Regional Governance of Renewables
In addition to the anticommons tragedy and potential regulatory com-
mons problems, a final element of renewable development that necessitates
regional action is renewables’ wholesale reliance upon transmission.  A large
wind or solar farm is useless if not connected to a transmission line that
227 See, e.g., Kristin Choo, The War of Winds, ABA J., Feb. 1, 2010 (discussing moratoria
on wind development passed by New York towns).
228 Zimmerman v. Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 218 P.3d 400, 413 (Kan. 2009) (upholding a
Wabaunsee County, Kansas Board of Commissioners’ ban on commercial wind turbines);
Choo, supra note 227. R
229 See, e.g., Outka, supra note 219 (manuscript at 35–36) (describing how local siting R
ignores comprehensive impacts of renewable energy and how federal processes such as the
National Environmental Policy Act also fail to account for cumulative environmental impacts.)
230 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 212. R
231 See supra note 168; see also Outka, supra note 219, (manuscript at 22–23) (describing R
how even states with centralized siting authority only offer centralized siting for relatively
large facilities — a benchmark that many renewable developments may not meet).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE208.txt unknown Seq: 36  2-AUG-11 9:28
512 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
carries the electricity generated to consumers.232  To complicate this prob-
lem, some of the best areas for renewable development are not only on state
borders but also in regions far from population centers.  There is a large
ideal renewable zone in western Utah, for example, which is far south of Salt
Lake City and far north of Las Vegas.233  Another zone lies over southeast
Colorado and the tip of the Oklahoma panhandle, far from Denver, Boulder,
and the large Texas and Oklahoma cities.234  And the most substantial renew-
able energy zone identified by the Western Governors’ Association covers
much of New Mexico, thus offering renewable opportunities for Albuquer-
que and Santa Fe but not for nearby states’ most populous cities.235  Trans-
mission is necessary to transport the vast quantities of renewable energy that
could be produced to populous areas, and the construction of thousands of
miles of shared infrastructure is no easy task.  The federal government has
attempted to address this challenge by modifying the process for siting trans-
mission lines,236 but states and their municipal agents still maintain the bulk
of authority over the process and tend to block proposed transmission
projects.237
Even within states, the transmission challenge for renewable energy can
be insurmountable without substantial government intervention.  In Texas,
for example, where the strongest wind blows in the western portion of the
state,238 the legislature set a renewable portfolio standard, which identifies a
percentage of electricity that must be provided by renewables within a cer-
tain timeframe. It later raised the standard.239  In order to ensure that more
renewable energy would be available to meet this higher standard, the legis-
lature passed several bills to jumpstart wind energy development.  The bills
232 See, e.g., Western Renewable Energy Zones, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://www.
westgov.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=219&Itemid=81 (last vis-
ited July 2, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“There is broad agreement
that a significant increase in the use of renewable energy is dependent on expansion of the
existing transmission grid.”).
233 See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 12. R
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See Brown and Rossi, supra note 41, at 741 (explaining that the Energy Policy Act of R
2005 allowed the “Department of Energy to designate National Interest Energy Transmission
Corridors” and empowered the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “to preempt state sit-
ing authorities to expand transmission in limited regions of the country facing transmission
constraints”).
237 Id. at 718 (explaining that municipalities — to which much of state siting authority has
been delegated — have conflicting objectives that can serve as substantial obstacles to the
transmission line siting process); see also Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference
Trap in Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 647 (2005) (observing that
“[t]wenty-two states even authorize localities to block transmission expansion projects” and
that transmission projects “frequently generat[e] state and local opposition”).
238 Texas’ Renewable Energy Resources, TEXAS STATE ENERGY CONSERVATION OFFICE,
http://www.infinitepower.org/reswind.htm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library) (explaining that “[t]he Panhandle contain[s] areas with winds
precisely suitable for electric power generation”).
239 See Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113 (explaining the two R
standards).
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required the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to identify Competitive
Renewable Energy Zone or “CREZ” areas.240  These areas were to be the
“hot spots” for wind energy renewable development and were to be identi-
fied based on the strength of the wind in a given region and wind companies’
commitment and financial ability to develop in the region.241  Once the
CREZ areas were identified, the legislature directed the PUC to map out
transmission zones242 for these renewable areas, which would carry electric-
ity to Dallas, Houston, Austin, and other populous parts of the state.243  The
PUC was to choose utility companies that would commit to developing the
transmission and then solidify the transmission routes through administrative
proceedings.244  These bills have been surprisingly successful and have
spurred a flurry of wind development in the state; Texas now produces more
wind energy than any other state.245  With an assurance of transmission, wind
developers are able to move forward with their projects.
Western states have recognized the need for renewable energy transmis-
sion development and have embarked upon a project similar to Texas’s
CREZ areas.  As Texas has already done, the Western Governors’ Associa-
tion aims to identify “those areas . . . that feature the potential for large scale
development of renewable resources in areas with low environmental im-
pacts” and to “facilitate the development of high voltage transmission to
those areas.”246  It has already made progress toward this goal, as it has com-
pleted a map of the WREZ areas and is beginning to discuss transmission
plans.247  Further, the Association has resolved to support federal policies
that “[e]ncourage proactive, transparent, stakeholder-driven regional trans-
mission expansion planning” and “defer to existing regional and sub-re-
gional processes that meet such standard.”248  But if there is no agency to
implement the transmission plan, as the Public Utility Commission did in
Texas, or to advise developers regarding development in the WREZ areas,
240 See Senate Bill 20 § 3(g)(1), enrolled version (July 2005), available at http://www.
capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/791/billtext/pdf/SB00020F.pdf (directing the Texas Public Utility
Commission to “designate competitive renewable energy zones”).
241 Senate Bill 20 § 3(g)(1),(3).
242 Senate Bill 20 § 3(g)(2).
243 See ERCOT, COMPETITIVE RENEWABLE-ENERGY ZONES TRANSMISSION OPTIMIZATION
STUDY 10 (2008), available at http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2008/
ERCOT_Website_Posting.zip (after opening zip file, follow “CREZ TOS STUDY FINAL”
file link).
244 Senate Bill 20 § 2(e).
245 Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113 (describing Texas as “the nation’s R
leader in wind energy”).
246 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at Executive R
Summary.
247 Id. See also WREZ Transmission Model Page, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://www.
westgov.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=102%3Ainitiatives&id=
220%3Awrez-transmission-model-page&Itemid=81 (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with
the Harvard Law School library) (describing efforts to suggest ideal transmission routes).
248 W. Governors’ Ass’n, Clean and Diversified Energy for the West, Policy Resolution 06-
10 (June 11, 2006), available at http://tribalclimate.org/PDFs/WGAResolutiononclean-energy
forthewest.pdf.
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regional renewables development in the West may not occur at the pace that
it needs to.  For areas like the Midwest that have strong wind potential but
no identified renewables areas or transmission plans, the pace of develop-
ment may be even slower. Potential developers in promising renewable areas
will not have any assurance that a transmission line will be built or that the
costs of the line will be shared by other renewable developers.  And without
this assurance, development of renewable infrastructure may be too risky
and expensive.
To make the renewable anticommons and regulatory commons manage-
able, as well as to solve transmission assurance problems, some of the prop-
erty rights within renewable parcels must be bundled together and placed
within the control of one regional entity.  The following Part describes ex-
isting models to suggest how this form of governance could be effectively
organized.
III. MODELS FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ANTICOMMONS
As described in Part II, utility-scale renewable energy development
faces two distinct challenges.  First, the multiple rights to exclusion within a
renewable parcel create a problem with anticommons elements, and com-
bined regulatory rights over the parcel may lead to a regulatory commons
tragedy.  Second, renewable projects rely upon an assurance of available
transmission lines to transport their product to population centers, and these
transmission lines must typically cross municipal and even state barriers.
Both of these impediments necessitate a regional solution.
Fortunately, states, municipalities, and federal agencies have already
dealt with similar challenges in areas outside of the energy field that can
provide some precedent for a regional solution.  The states within the Sus-
quehanna River Basin, for example — all of which share the river’s water —
identified challenges with strong parallels to the renewables tragedy: “[t]he
water resources of the basin are presently subject to the duplicating, overlap-
ping, and uncoordinated administration of a large number of governmental
agencies which exercise a multiplicity of powers resulting in a splintering of
authority and responsibility.”249  States within the Delaware River Basin de-
scribed nearly identical barriers to effective management, observing that the
basin’s water resources were subject to administration by “forty-three State
agencies, fourteen interstate agencies, and nineteen Federal agencies,”250 all
of which also exercised a “multiplicity of powers”251 over the resources.
The problems faced by users of shared resources beyond the renewables
arena align somewhat closely with the challenges in the renewable energy
249 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Preamble (July 17, 1968), available at http://www.
srbc.net/about/srbc_compact.pdf.
250 Delaware River Basin Compact, Preamble (Nov. 2, 1961), available at http://www.
state.nj.us/drbc/regs/compa.pdf.
251 Id.
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area, and the lessons from the regional organizations that address these
problems can inform regional energy boards.  This is not to say that shared
resources such as rivers and lakes are identical to the shared land and fugi-
tive resources within a renewable parcel.252  But the institutions formed to
address the multiple and sometimes competing rights to water resources at
minimum suggest that regional governance is possible and provide a useful
analogy.  This Part examines these existing organizations as models and also
looks to an informal regional organization that has already emerged in the
renewables area.
A. Informal Planning for Shared Renewable Zones
This Article focuses most closely on interstate organizations that have
well-developed institutional structures and formalized mechanisms for im-
plementing and enforcing regional rules.  Only these types of institutions
will ensure effective utility-scale renewable development.  Within the energy
area, however, several less formal organizations have already emerged, and
these demonstrate that states are interested in forming regional alliances, in-
cluding alliances geared toward renewable energy.
All of the regional organizations addressed here have some unique ele-
ment of relevance to renewables.  Western Renewable Energy Zones are of
course directly relevant, despite their lack of regulatory authority.  River ba-
sin commissions have some land use authority in order to protect water qual-
ity, and they have also been active in responding to recent energy
developments in the Northeast, suggesting that they have relatively effective
structures for addressing energy development.253  Finally, the Tahoe River
Basin Commission has direct and extensive land use authority — an element
that will be essential for a Regional Energy Board.  I do not intend to sug-
gest, however, that these are the only relevant regional organizations to be
considered.  Due to space limitations, this Article does not discuss in detail
many other regional organizations that could provide equally or more effec-
tive models for Regional Energy Boards.
1. The Western Governors’ Association’s Western Renewable Energy
Zones Effort
The Western Governors’ Association is a regional organization specifi-
cally oriented toward renewable energy through its “Western Renewable En-
252 Water and renewable development do share, on a localized basis, similar fugitive re-
source challenges.  Just as an upstream user can pollute or overuse water, upstream developers
can block wind and sunlight.  For a description of these upstream challenges, see Wiseman et
al., supra note 155. R
253 See Natural Gas Development Regulations, Delaware River Basin Commission (pro-
posed Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/naturalgas-draftregs.pdf (pro-
posed in response to a flurry of applications for hydraulic fracturing of the Marcellus Shale).
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ergy Zones” (WREZ) effort.  This “collaborative process”254 is only
advisory255 and thus lacks the power to approve energy siting and construc-
tion, but aspects of this organization should be emulated in the formation of
regional energy boards.  The western states’ regional effort to expand renew-
able energy production began in earnest around 2004, when the Western
Governors’ Association launched the “Clean and Diversified Energy Initia-
tive.”256 The Association aimed, among other goals, to develop more “clean
energy” resources, including renewables, throughout the West and to im-
prove electricity transmission.257  Eleven state members of the Association
have since joined two Canadian provinces258 and the U.S. Department of
Energy in an effort to spur renewable energy development.  These parties,
through several committees of the Western Governors’ Association, first set
out to identify ideal renewable areas in the West (Western Renewable En-
ergy Zones, or WREZ), which are defined as the “most cost effective and
developable,” as well as the “highest quality” areas for a given renewable
resource.259
The WREZ Steering Committee — which included the governors of the
eleven member states, Canadian premiers, officials from state public utility
commissions, and representatives of several federal agencies — guided the
process of identifying ideal renewable zones.260  The Steering Committee
formed a Technical Committee of energy experts and non-governmental or-
ganizations; this committee, in turn, directed three working groups.  One
working group identified the areas in the West with the highest levels of
incident solar radiation and wind velocity as well as the fewest land uses or
regulations that might impede the construction of renewable technology.261
A second identified wildlife and environmental constraints in the areas listed
as potential renewable zones,262 and a third group developed a model to cal-
culate the cost and “economic attractiveness” of the potential zones identi-
fied.263  These working groups produced several draft products and held a
254 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES, CHARTER (2008),
available at communities.nrri.org/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=195538&name=DL
FE-4579.pdf.
255 See id. (showing that the WRE process will identify ideal areas for renewable develop-
ment, develop “conceptual” transmission plans to augment this development, build “interstate
cooperation” and coordinate power plants’ “renewable procurement”); see also W. GOVER-
NORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 12 (emphasizing that the ideal “hubs” R
identified for renewable development do not indicate that development will in fact occur
within the hub).
256 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Western Governors Unanimously Approve
Governor’s Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative  (June 22, 2004), available at http://gov38.
ca.gov/press-release/2985.
257 W. Governors’ Ass’n, supra note 248 (describing the June 2004 initiative (resolution 4- R
13)).
258 W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 14, at 1. R
259 Id. at 7, 8.
260 Id. at 4.
261 Id. at 4, 6–9 (describing the work of the Zone Identification and Technical Analysis
working group).
262 Id.
263 Id. at 4–5.
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one-month public comment period on the drafts.264  Staff reviewed the more
than eighty comments received and modified the drafts accordingly.265  The
Steering Committee then produced a map of the WREZ areas, which partici-
pating states and provinces reviewed prior to publication in order to “reduce
or eliminate” suggested renewables areas that posed wildlife concerns.266
The final WREZ areas therefore show the regions of the West with the high-
est renewable energy potential and fewest use conflicts, which are likely the
most economical areas for renewable development.
The Western Governors’ Association also produced a modeling tool that
allows developers to assess the attractiveness of a particular renewable zone
in terms of the cost of generating and delivering power from that zone.267  It
is now working to identify the best location of transmission corridors that
would run from the renewable areas.268  Finally, the Association eventually
aims to aggregate the purchasing of renewable electricity throughout the
West269 and to address “the political and regulatory obstacles to the permit-
ting and construction of cross-jurisdictional transmission lines and renewa-
ble energy projects.”270
The WREZ process provides an important starting point for the regional
governance that is necessary for large-scale renewables development be-
cause it highlights ideal zones to potential builders and suggests where trans-
mission lines might be located.  In drawing such zones, it has begun to
create renewable parcels.  Further, the process aims to aggregate demand for
and provision of renewable energy by region,271 encourage the construction
of transmission lines from newly-built renewable resources to energy cus-
tomers,272 enhance regional collaboration, and reduce regulatory barriers to
renewables development.  But the Western Governors’ Association, as cur-
rently chartered, lacks the legal authority to sufficiently reduce the govern-
ance challenges associated with renewable parcels.  The Association does
not have the authority to review and certify proposed renewable develop-
ment within these zones, streamline approval processes for these projects, or
permit the necessary transmission lines from the zones.
2. Other Regional Energy Organizations
A number of other regional energy organizations exist that could in-
form the regional effort proposed in this Article.  As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, the Southern States Energy Board is an interstate compact that aims,
among other goals, to eliminate “barriers to the use of efficient energy and
264 Id. at 10, 14.
265 Id. at 14.
266 Id. at 16.
267 Id. at 16–17.
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environmental technologies,” “facilitate the implementation of energy and
environmental policies between federal, state and local governments and the
private sector,” and “support improved energy efficient technologies that
pollute less and contribute to a clean global environment.”273  This group has
not tended to focus on renewable siting, however, and has instead concen-
trated its energies on identifying ideal areas for carbon sequestration and
supporting sequestration techniques,274 tracking state and federal legislation
related to the environment and energy (including renewable portfolio stan-
dards),275 and supporting other activities that do not address siting issues.276
For the western region, Uma Outka has identified several movements
toward regionalism in energy.277  Working under the auspices of the Western
Governors’ Association, several western states have focused more specifi-
cally on renewables in interstate agreements.  Idaho, Montana, and Nevada,
for example, have entered into a formal memorandum of understanding that
creates a “State Advisory Committee” to “develop, facilitate, and coordi-
nate a consolidated siting and permitting process” for two interstate trans-
mission lines that will, among other things, expand these states’ access to
new renewable and “clean coal” generation.278  Similarly, Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, have considered “collaborative decision mak-
ing” opportunities for permitting renewable generation and transmission.279
These existing energy institutions have taken important steps toward
demonstrating that regional governance in the energy field is possible and is
slowly moving forward.  But a regional authority that has some land use and
permitting authority is necessary, and no institutions with these powers have
yet to be formed in this area.  Several existing regional organizations outside
of the renewables areas have this type of authority, however, including the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and two river basin commissions in the
Northeast, and these provide further pieces of a model for regional energy
boards.
273 About Us, S. STATES ENERGY BD., http://www.sseb.org/about-us.php (last visited May
20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
274 Carbon Management, S. STATES ENERGY BD., http://www.sseb.org/secarb.php (last
visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
275 Energy and Environmental Legislative Monitoring, S. STATES ENERGY BD., http://
www.sseb.org/legislative-monitoring.php (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
276 See Programs, S. STATES ENERGY BD., http://www.sseb.org/programs.php (last visited
May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (not describing renewables or
siting among its programs).
277 Outka, supra note 219, at 31–32. R
278 Memorandum of Understanding Among the Governors of Idaho, Montana, and Nevada
for Purposes of Coordinating Siting and Permitting the Northernlights Transmission Projects 2
(May 23, 2006), available at http://governor.mt.gov/news/docs/NorthernLights_Govenors
MOU.pdf.
279 Hurlbut, supra note 44, at 680. R
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B. Regional Governance of Land Uses Surrounding a Shared Lake
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency was formed to address pollution
issues in the Lake Tahoe basin, which lies over the California-Nevada bor-
der.280  The lake is a celebrated tourist destination and development magnet,
but it has slowly been degraded281 due to soil and other surface pollutants
that run off from the land surrounding the lake into the water below.282  The
land contributing to this runoff falls within several municipal jurisdictions
and two different states.283  Even if one town agreed to impose restrictions on
development and to require careful erosion control, several others could re-
fuse these measures, thus causing continued pollution of the lake.  A re-
gional authority with land use control was thus needed, and California and
Nevada entered into a compact, which was approved by Congress in 1980.284
As is necessary for any regional organization, the compact defined the
bounds of the region to be governed, which included portions of California
and Nevada counties and cities that are adjacent to the lake.285  It then cre-
ated a regional governing institution as a “separate legal entity,”286 named it,
and defined its organization.  The Compact provided that the Agency’s gov-
erning body would include a California and a Nevada delegation, and each
delegation was to consist of members appointed by county commissioners,
the state governor along with natural resource-related agencies, and a mem-
ber selected by the appointed delegation members.287  The Compact then de-
scribed how agency members were to avoid conflicts of interest in voting,
provided that members would receive compensation for their expenses, and
required the members to meet at least monthly in a hearing open to the pub-
lic.288  It also defined member term lengths, vacancies, and voting proce-
dures.289  Under the Compact, the governing board was not to act alone; it
was required to appoint an advisory planning commission, for which the
compact also specified appointment and voting procedures.290  And finally,
the Compact directed the board to establish an “office within the region,”291
thus ensuring that the regional governing body had a physical space for its
operations; the Compact also identified the personnel positions that must be
formed to manage the office and support the agency.292
280 See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, sec. II(a), Dec. 19, 1980, available at http://
www.trpa.org/documents/about_trpa/Bistate_Compact.pdf.
281 See id. at sec. I(a).
282 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307–08
(2002) (describing the runoff).
283 See id. at 307–08 (describing the areas contributing to the pollution of the lake).
284 See Tahoe Compact, supra note 280. R
285 Id. at sec. II(a).
286 Id. at sec. III (a).
287 Id. at sec. III (a).
288 Id. at sed. III (a)(5), (b), (d).
289 Id. at sec. III(e)-(g).
290 Id. at sec. III(h).
291 Id. at sec. III(i).
292 Id. at sec. IV.
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In addition to establishing the organizational structure of a new regional
agency, the Tahoe Compact defined the duties and powers of the agency’s
governing board and planning commission.  It directed the agency to consult
with California and Nevada as well as several federal agencies in order to
establish “environmental threshold carrying capacities”293 for the Tahoe re-
gion, meaning environmental standards necessary to maintain scenic and
recreational qualities of the area, among others.294  The agency was to then
adopt a regional plan,295 which was to be a “single enforceable”296 plan that
covered transportation, land use, recreation, conservation, public services
and facilities, and air quality within the region.297  And — in a provision that
will be key to regional governance of renewable development — the Agency
was required to “adopt all necessary ordinances, rules, and regulations to
effectuate the adopted regional plan,”298 which were to set standards for eve-
rything from “subdivision” and “zoning” to “tree removal; solid waste dis-
posal; sewage disposal; land fills, excavation, cuts and grading” and
“mobile-home parks; house relocation; [and] outdoor advertising.”299  To
give more teeth to the already extensive powers of this new regional com-
mission, the Compact provided that these rules were to preempt require-
ments adopted by “[a]ny political subdivision or public agency,” unless
these entities adopted a stricter standard.300  From an anticommons perspec-
tive, this provision clearly delineated the hierarchy among rights holders.
Finally, to further empower the regional agency to regulate area land uses,
any project proposed in the region covered by the Compact could not occur
without the prior review and approval of the agency.301  And in a provision
that prompted a takings challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court,302 the Compact
even temporarily halted “works of development in the region” that could
cause disharmony with the required regional plan — as directed by the legis-
latures of California and Nevada.303
Using the powers set forth in the Compact, the Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency has since actively controlled development in the Lake Tahoe
region.  It adopted the required “Environmental Threshold Planning Capaci-
ties” in 1982304 and a regional plan in 1987.305  The Code of Ordinances
293 Id. at sec. V(b).
294 Id. at sec. II(i).
295 Id. at sec. V(c).
296 Id.
297 Id. at sec. V(c)(1)-(5), V(e).
298 Id. at sec. VI(a).
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. at sec. VI(b).
302 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306
(2002) (addressing a takings claim filed by real estate owners who challenged moratoria on
development “imposed . . . [by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency] during the process of
devising a comprehensive land-use plan”).
303 Tahoe Compact, supra note 280, at sec. VI(c). R
304 Environmental Issues, TAHOE REG’L PLANNING AGENCY, http://www.trpa.org/default.
aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=347 (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
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within the regional plan sets forth detailed permitting procedures for actions
within the governed area.  Many activities may not be approved by the
Agency unless the Agency first finds that the proposed “project is consistent
with, and will not adversely affect implementation of the Regional Plan,”
that it will “not cause the environmental threshold carrying capacities to be
exceeded,” and that the project will meet “federal, state or local air and
water quality standards.”306  If approved, a project is then “subject to inspec-
tions” by the Agency “at any reasonable time,” and if a project fails an
inspection, the Agency may issue correction notices and cease and desist
orders.307  As shown by the powers granted to the Agency in the Compact
and its subsequent activities, the Agency has broad discretion to control land
uses in the Lake Tahoe region and to regulate the activities within that re-
gion.  Parts of this model should be transferred to renewable energy boards,
in that the boards should have the power to permit proposed development,
determine acceptable locations of the development, regulate the safety of the
renewable technology, and wield other land use-related powers.  The extent
to which existing state and local powers in this area should be ceded to a
regional energy board is discussed in Part IV.
C. Regional Governance of Shared River Resources
Just as development surrounding a once-pristine lake on a state border
requires regional oversight, rivers that flow across state borders pose re-
gional challenges.  This is demonstrated in the Northeast, where the Susque-
hanna River Basin drains from Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland
(including 67 counties),308 and the Delaware River flows through New York,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.309  Municipalities and industry
pump water from these rivers for drinking water and other uses,310 power
plants continuously demand water for cooling;311 pollution runs over land
305 Regional Plan Update, TAHOE REG’L PLANNING AGENCY, http://www.trpa.org/
default.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=130 (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
306 TAHOE REG’L PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6.3.A, available at http://
www.trpa.org/documents/docdwnlds/ordinances/COCh06.pdf.
307 TAHOE REG’L PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8.3, available at http://
www.trpa.org/documents/docdwnlds/ordinances/COCh08.pdf.
308 Susquehanna River Basin Comm’n, Susquehanna River Basin, http://www.srbc.net/
pubinfo/docs/Susq%20River%20Basin%20General%20%2811_06%29.PDF (last visited Nov.
2006) (on file with the Harvard Law School library).
309 See Delaware River Basin Commission, Delaware River Basin, http://www.state.nj.us/
drbc/drbc4.htm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School library)
(showing a map last updated Nov. 2006).
310 See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission, Application Status Page as of 2/15/2011,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/dockets/PRBdocketsNJ021710.pdf (last visited May 20, 2011) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing requests from school districts, municipali-
ties, and industry for water withdrawals).
311 See, e.g., Information Sheet, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, http://www.srbc.
net/pubinfo/docs/35779_1.pdf (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
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from farms, golf courses, parking lots, and lawns into the river;312 and facto-
ries and wastewater treatment plants pipe pollutants directly into the
water.313  As a result of these shared uses, states began sparring over rights to
these river waters, and following a resolution in the Supreme Court in 1954,
they began devising formal compacts to avoid future litigation.314  Congress
approved the Delaware River Basin Compact in 1961315 and the similar Sus-
quehanna River Basin Compact in 1970316 and appointed river basin com-
missions to implement and administer these formal agreements.317
The Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts, like the Tahoe
Compact, define a region to be governed,318 create an independent legal en-
tity as a governing organization, and set out the composition, voting struc-
ture, and powers of the organization.  The United States and the four states
within the Delaware River Basin formed the Delaware River Basin Compact
in 1961 with the goal of developing a comprehensive plan for the manage-
ment and use of the river.319  The Compact created an “agency and instru-
mentality of the governments of the respective signatory parties” in the form
of the Delaware River Basin Commission,320  which was to govern all land
that drains into the Delaware River and its tributaries — and even land
outside of the basin when necessary.321  As directed by the Compact, the
Commission was composed of the governors of the signatory states and one
Commissioner appointed by the President,322 and each had one vote.323  The
Compact assigned numerous powers and duties to the Commission, includ-
ing, among others, to “adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies
for water conservation, control, use and management in the basin”;324 adopt
School Library) (describing evaporation of water from cooling towers at power plants as a
consumptive water use of the Susquehanna).
312 See, e.g., Kevin H. McGonigal, Nutrients and Suspended Sediment Transported in the
Susquehanna River Basin, 2008, and Trends, January 1985 Through December 2008, Dec. 31,
2009, at 2–4, 30, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N, available at http://www.srbc.net/
pubinfo/techdocs/publication_267/techreport267.PDF (discussing land uses in the basin and
nutrient and sediment loads due to runoff).
313 See, e.g., Determining Total Maximum Daily Load in the Susquehanna River Basin,
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.srbc.net/pubinfo/
docs/TMDLsheet%289_09%29.PDF (describing point sources of river pollutants).
314 GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 49, at 39. R
315 Id. at 40.
316 Id. at 42.
317 Id. at 40, 42.
318 See Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 249, at sec. 2.7 (defining the R
bounds of regional jurisdiction as the bounds of the river basin, which is determined by geo-
graphic features); Delaware River Basin Compact, supra note 250, at sec. 1.2(a) (defining the R
Basin as “the area of drainage into the Delaware River and its tributaries, including Delaware
Bay”).
319 Delaware River Basin Compact, supra note 250, at sec. 1–3 (stating preamble. R
320 Id. at sec. 2.1.
321 See id. at sec. 1.2(a) (defining the basin); id. at sec. 2.7 (describing the area of jurisdic-
tion of the Commission).
322 Id. at sec. 2.2.
323 Id. at sec. 2.5.
324 Id. at sec. 3.1.
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a comprehensive plan to effectuate these policies;325 issue permits for re-
quested “allocations, diversions and releases”326 from the river; “assume ju-
risdiction to control future pollution and abate existing pollution in the
waters of the basin,” if necessary;327  and regulate hydroelectric development
of the river.328  The Commission has since adopted water quality standards, a
program to allocate waste load among various users of the river, and “regu-
lations for implementing and enforcing the standards.”329  It has also regu-
lated development within the floodplain of the river, passed regulations that
require water metering for large water withdrawals, and passed several regu-
lations limiting pollutants that may be released into the river.330  No project
with a “substantial effect on the water resources of the basin” may be under-
taken “by any person, corporation or governmental authority” without first
having been approved by the Commission.331  Further, the Commission may
enforce its laws by issuing orders to violators following investigation and a
hearing.332
To carry out this broad range of duties, the Commission consults and
works with its member parties333 and appoints advisory committees, where
needed.334  Whenever the Commission embarks upon a project to physically
improve water quality, it must first “review and consider all existing rights,
plans and programs of the signatory parties, their political subdivisions, pri-
vate parties, and water users” and hold a public hearing.335  To avoid con-
flicts among the parties to the Commission, no party may plan Commission-
related projects or make any expenditures for river-related facilities and
projects without first consulting with the Commission.336
The Susquehanna River Basin Commission — another regional organi-
zation that governs shared water resources — emerged just over a decade
after the Delaware River Basin Compact took effect, and its jurisdiction,
powers, and duties are similar to those of the Delaware Commission.  The
Compact that forms the Commission also defines the area of jurisdiction by
physical boundaries, which in this case include the area of drainage of the
Susquehanna River and its tributaries.337  Like the Delaware Commission,
the Susquehanna River Basin Commission is “an agency and instrumental-
325 Id. at sec. 3.2.
326 Id. at sec. 3.3.
327 Id. at sec. 5.2.
328 Id. at sec. 9.2.
329 Delaware River Basin Commission, Listing of DRBC Milestones and Accomplish-
ments, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/milestones.htm (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the
Harvard Law School library).
330 Id.
331 Delaware River Basin Compact, supra note 250, at sec. 3.8. R
332 Id. at sec. 5.4.
333 Id. at sec. 3.9.
334 Id. at sec. 3.10.
335 Id. at sec. 4.4.
336 Id. at sec. 11.1–2.
337 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 249, at sec. 1.2 (1972). R
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ity” of its signatory parties.338  Its members — each with one vote on the
Commission339 — are the governors of the party states and an appointee of
the President.340  The Compact directs the Commission to “[e]stablish stan-
dards of planning, decision, and operation of all projects and facilities in the
basin to the extent they affect water resources”;341 plan for the management
of water resources;342 regulate water allocation and diversion, where
needed;343 approve hydroelectric dams;344 and assume jurisdiction over water
quality, where necessary,345 among other powers.  Like the Delaware River
Commission, the Susquehanna River Commission has since issued regula-
tions to carry out its responsibilities,346 and it has the power to issue penalties
for violations.347  In 2010, the Commission ordered a natural gas company to
stop all water withdrawal operations after the company failed to obtain a
water withdrawal permit,348 and it fined another company $20,000 for with-
drawing more water than was allowed in its permit.349
Both river basin commissions are unique, in that states and the federal
government have ceded substantial planning and regulatory authority to a
regional entity.  These entities must consult with constituent parties and af-
fected private parties, but they have the authority to independently imple-
ment and enforce their regulations.  This type of system is sensible for a
region that shares a vital water resource, and its lessons transfer substantially
to shared renewable land resources and other energy areas, as discussed in
Part IV.
D. Streamlined Permitting Processes for Energy Siting
A final existing regional institution that consolidates local, state, and
federal requirements within one forum is the streamlined permitting process.
Typically, individual states mandate these processes, and such procedures
therefore lack the interstate qualities of the water and land use-based institu-
tions described above.  But they combine multiple authorities within one
process and are thus regional in nature.
338 Id. at sec. 2.1.
339 Id. at sec. 2.5.
340 Id. at sec. 2.2.
341 Id. at sec. 3.4.
342 Id. at sec. 3.5.
343 Id. at sec. 3.8.
344 Id. at sec. 10.1.
345 Id. at sec. 5.2.
346 See generally 18 C.F.R. pts. 801, 806, 807, 808 (2008).
347 Susquehanna River Basin, supra note 249, at sec. 15.17. R
348 See Press Release, Susquehanna River Basin Commission, SRBC Orders Natural Gas
Driller to Stop all Water-Related Work at Drilling Sites in Tioga County, PA (Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.srbc.net/pubinfo/press/docs/Project%20ReviewNaturalGasNovus
CeaseOrder11310.pdf.
349 See James Loewenstein, Chesapeake Energy Fined $20,000 Over Water Withdrawal
Violations, DAILY REVIEW, Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://thedailyreview.com/news/chesa
peake-energy-fined-20-000-over-water-withdrawal-violations-1.696315.
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In Washington State, the legislature recognized the need for the “devel-
opment of a procedure for the selection and utilization of sites for energy
facilities” to “avoid costly duplication in the siting process and ensure that
decisions are made timely and without unnecessary delay.”350  To accom-
plish this, the legislature created the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
and empowered the Council “to integrate its site evaluation activity with
activities of federal agencies having jurisdiction in such matters to avoid
unnecessary duplication;”351 to issue air quality permits under the state-run
Clean Air Act program;352 and to “serve as an interagency coordinating body
for energy-related issues.”353  The Council may also provide expedited re-
view to renewable energy facilities in certain circumstances.354  Most entities
proposing an energy development must apply to the Council for site certifi-
cation; the Council reviews the proposed development for social and envi-
ronmental impacts, ensures that the development will comply with all state
and municipal laws applicable to the project, and then makes a recommenda-
tion to the governor.355  As part of its recommendation, it includes a Site
Certification Agreement with conditions for the construction of the energy
project.356  If the project is approved, the Council is then responsible for
enforcing state laws and the conditions within the Certification
Agreement.357
A minority of other states have implemented similar streamlined energy
siting processes.  Oregon’s Energy Facility Siting Council, for example, re-
ceives applications for many large energy facility sites; reviews the applica-
tions; hears comments from state agencies, cities, and counties; and
approves or rejects the applications.358  In determining whether or not to
grant a site certificate, the Council “consults with other state and local agen-
cies to ensure that the Council considers all governmental concerns.”359  Ap-
plicants still face separate municipal laws, but they may choose to have the
Council determine compliance.360
350 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.010 (West 2010).
351 Id. § 80.50.040(10).
352 Id. § 80.50.040(12) (empowering the Council to “issue permits in compliance with
applicable provisions of the federally approved state implementation plan adopted in accor-
dance with the Federal Clean Air Act”).
353 Id. § 80.50.040(13).
354 Id. § 80.50.075  (allowing a person to “apply to the council for an expedited process-
ing” of a certification for an energy facility).
355 Washington State, Siting/Review Process, ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUN-




358 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 469.350, 469.370 (West 2010).
359 The Siting Process for Energy Facilities, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/
ENERGY/SITING/process.shtml (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
360 Id. (“When the Preliminary Application is submitted, the applicant must choose
whether to seek land use approval from the local jurisdiction or to have the Council make the
land use determination.”).
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For large thermal power plants, California has similarly placed all au-
thority over energy siting within the California Energy Commission, which
replaces the previous requirements of all other state, local, regional, or even
federal agencies, where the Commission is not preempted by federal law.361
The Commission, in addition to pulling together what was once a host of
different permitting and approval requirements, has also attempted to
streamline its processes.  For certain solar developments, it has entered into
agreements with the Bureau of Land Management and other federal agencies
to ensure that duplicate information is not requested for federal and state
environmental reviews and that required federal and state public hearings are
joined, where possible.362
Some streamlined processes, such as Oregon’s, simply collect the many
state and local regulations within one agency and provide a “one-stop shop”
for developers; others, like California’s, preempt lower level regulations for
the siting of certain projects while also coordinating processes among nu-
merous agencies.  Regardless of the procedure followed, streamlined
processes and independent agencies operating under compacts help to over-
come anticommons barriers by collecting rights of exclusion and sometimes
creating a hierarchy among these rights.
E. Brief Consideration of Other Regional Institutions
Many other regional institutions could serve as similarly useful models
for regional governance of renewables.  Although space does not permit a
thorough analysis of these institutions, a brief mention of several is merited.
The Columbia River Gorge Commission, like the Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, has land use authority over a shared interstate resource — a
scenic area that “includes portions of three Oregon and three Washington
counties.”363  The Commission was formed by the Columbia River Gorge
National Scenic Area Act,364 which, among other things, delineates the
boundaries of the region governed365 and directs the Commission to “de-
velop land use designations for the use of non-Federal lands within the
361 See CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 25500 (West 2010) (“In accordance with the provi-
sions of this division, the commission shall have the exclusive power to certify all sites and
related facilities in the state, whether a new site and related facility or a change or addition to
an existing facility.  The issuance of a certificate by the commission shall be in lieu of any
permit, certificate, or similar document required by any state, local or regional agency, or
federal agency to the extent permitted by federal law.”).
362 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bu-
reau of Land Mgmt. Cal. Desert Dist. and the Cal. Energy Comm. Staff Concerning Joint
Environmental Review for Solar Thermal Power Plant Projects 1, supra note 165 (describing R
the agencies’ agreement to coordinate processes wherever possible).
363 About the Scenic Area, COLUMBIA RIVER GORGE COMM’N, http://www.gorgecommis
sion.org/about_scenic_area.cfm?CFID=12544773&CFTOKEN=39820430 (last visited May
20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
364 16 U.S.C. § 544c.
365 Id. § 544b.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE208.txt unknown Seq: 51  2-AUG-11 9:28
2011] Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance 527
scenic area” as part of a Scenic Area Management Plan366 and approve or
reject county land use ordinances that are consistent with the management
plan.367  The Commission has formal land use regulatory authority, and —
like a local zoning board — issues determinations about acceptable property
uses in the area by approving or denying various development requests
under the Act and the Plan.368  Also similar to the Tahoe Regional Planning
Authority, the Commission has formal enforcement authority, including the
ability to seek injunctions to prevent individuals in non-urban portions of the
scenic area from violating the Act, the management plan, land use ordi-
nances, or Commission guidelines.369
A renewable development is not exactly analogous to a shared lake,
river, or scenic area.  The quality of the fugitive resource is at issue — as too
many developments within one area can, for example, shade solar panels or
reduce wind flow — but the primary concern is the need to have a regional
land use authority.  All of the regional institutions discussed above are rele-
vant, however, because they exhibit some degree of this type of authority,
with the exception of the Western Renewable Energy Zones.  Other regional
models to consider are those formed to site undesirable land uses, such as
nuclear waste dumps.370  Although these regional bodies do not typically cre-
ate a commission with regional land use authority, and have encountered
problems,371 they were intended to assist in initial siting decisions372 —
a consideration that will be important for utility-scale renewable
developments.
All of these regional models, whether addressing a shared fugitive re-
source, a scenic area that crosses boundaries, or a common waste problem,
may to some extent help to overcome anticommons or regulatory commons-
type challenges by creating a defined area of governance, establishing pri-
mary governing authority in one institution, and collecting and streamlining
regulations within that institution.  This both defines the problem to be ad-
dressed and the government to take the lead — thus avoiding the anticom-
mons tragedy — and streamlines exclusion rights within a manageable
366 Id. § 544d.
367 Id. § 544e.
368 See, e.g., COLUMBIA RIVER GORGE COMM’N, Director’s Decision, C10-0013-K-G-19
(Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.gorgecommission.org/client/pdfs/projects/C10-0013%
20Ernst%20decision.pdf (approving a landowner’s request to remove a garage and a barn);
COLUMBIA RIVER GORGE COMM’N, Director’s Decision, C10-0013-K-G-11 (Nov. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.gorgecommission.org/client/pdfs/projects/C10-0006%20Davis%20
decision.pdf (approving landowners’ request to construct a house).
369 16 U.S.C. § 544m.
370 See Samantha Dreilinger, Note, Fall-Out: New York v. United States and the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Problem, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 183, 190–94 (2010) (discussing the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985, which “encouraged states to
enter into interstate compacts to provide for the establishment and operation of low-level radi-
oactive waste sites”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (2006).
371 Id. at 197–98 (describing how New York v. United States has restricted the availability
of tools necessary to “enforce interstate compact decisions”) (citing 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).
372 Id. at 191 (describing monetary incentives provided to states that located a selected
host site and developed a “siting plan”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(i-ii)).
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process, thus reducing the transaction costs of development.  The following
Part discusses how this regional solution should be accomplished in the re-
newable field.
IV. BUILDING FROM REGIONAL MODELS TO FORM
REGIONAL ENERGY BOARDS
As described in Part II, utility-scale renewable energy development
faces anticommons and regulatory commons-types tragedies — tragedies
that also arise in other resource areas.  Just as regional organizations have
been formed to address shared water challenges, these tragedies will best be
solved by the formation of a regional governing authority or “regional en-
ergy board.”  To operate effectively, this board must have many of the char-
acteristics of the regional governance models outlined above.  First, the
board must be an independent agency; it must not function within an ex-
isting federal, state, or municipal entity.  Second, it must have the authority
to issue siting permits and to conduct the associated reviews that occur prior
to issuing a permit, including environmental, cultural, historic, economic,
and other reviews.  In other words, many regulatory powers that now govern
at the federal, state, and municipal level must be procedurally, and partially
substantively, consolidated within one governing entity.  This Part, building
from the models described above, suggests how regional energy boards can
be successfully organized; it proposes broad solutions and leaves specific
mechanics of the boards for future work.
A. Forming Independent Regional Entities
Regional energy boards to govern the development of utility-scale
renewables must be independent regional entities similar to those established
by the regional institutions described in Part III.  Many of the parties that
hold rights within renewable parcels already have their own entrenched
processes — municipal zoning decisions and state energy commission re-
views, for example — and these processes would not be easily modified to
incorporate the many other parties with exclusion rights in a parcel.  Further,
the siting of renewable energy is a contentious process subject to public
choice concerns.  Private property owners often oppose the technology on
the grounds of nuisance and aesthetics,373 certain industry actors object to the
373 See Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs: Generating Conflict, Reducing
Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 441–42 (2010) (discussing residents’ objections
to a proposed wind farm in Nevada); Rick Strange, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Intersection
of Energy Policy and Broader Governmental Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1,
32–33 (2009–10) (describing several “NIMBY challenges to wind farms” around the county);
Stephen Harland Butler, Comment, Headwinds to a Clean Energy Future: Nuisance Suits
Against Wind Energy Projects in the United States, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1337, 1354–72 (2009)
(describing nuisance suits against wind farms).
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cost374 or the competition posed by renewables,375 and some nonprofit groups
worry about the environmental effects.376  The creation of an independent
agency will not prevent the capture of the process by these interested parties,
but in the short term it will provide a new forum not previously captured by
repeat players.  All parties will have a seat at the table, and all will have to
familiarize themselves with the new process.  For proposed sites that cross
municipal and state borders, no one government will solely control the deci-
sionmaking process, and homefield advantage will be eliminated.
An additional justification for the formation of an independent agency
is the importance of equitably sharing governance responsibilities.  Agencies
require buildings, staff, and funding, and an independent agency that follows
the directions of its charter can help to ensure a fair cost-sharing structure.
The Delaware River Basin Compact, for instance, required the Commission
to “develop equitable cost sharing and reimbursement formulas for the sig-
natory parties” by entering into “contracts and arrangements for sharing fi-
nancial responsibility,” developing procedures to properly allocate cost
based on the purpose of each project, and establishing a reimbursement sys-
tem.377  An independent regional entity to govern renewables development
could implement a similar system to accurately and fairly allocate costs.
To establish the independent regional energy board suggested here,
states that share ideal renewable resources should work with Congress to
form a compact.  Federal involvement is necessary because the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction over wholesale interstate sales
of electricity and interstate transmission,378 and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment controls many of the lands with the highest concentrations of renewa-
ble fuels.379  To provide a concrete example of a possible independent
regional energy board, Arizona, Southern California, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Utah, for example, could form a Southwest Regional Energy Compact,
374 See, e.g., Scott Bauer, Manufacturers Oppose Wisconsin Clean Energy Plan, MANU-
FACTURING.NET (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.manufacturing.net/News-Manufacturers-Oppose-
Wisconsin-Clean-Energy-Plan-010710.aspx (reporting that industry opposed the Wisconsin
governor’s plan “that calls for increasing the use of renewable fuels”).
375 See, e.g., Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources in the Canada/U.S. Context,
Discussion Following the Remarks of Dr. Jhirad, 28 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 329, 333 (2002) (argu-
ing that oil, natural gas, and coal companies all oppose renewables).
376 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 373, at 442–43 (discussing environmental groups’ opposi- R
tion to wind projects).
377 Delaware River Basin Compact, supra note 250, at sec. 11.4. R
378 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (declaring federal jurisdiction over “business which consists of
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce”).
379 See Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, States and United States Wind Resource
Maps, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing the strongest onshore wind resources to be
located in the Midwest and West).  BLM lands are primarily located within the same regions.
See Federal Lands, NATIONALATLAS.GOV, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/printable/fedlands.
html (follow “Federal Lands” hyperlink under “Map Maker” hyperlink) (last visited June 30,
2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (showing BLM lands in yellow appearing
primarily in the Midwest and West).
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which would establish the Southwest Regional Energy Board.  Once ap-
proved by Congress, the Compact would direct the Board to plan for future
renewables development, just as the water commissions described above im-
plement comprehensive plans for water management.  Much renewable
planning work in the West has already been completed through the Western
Renewable Energy Zone process380 and could be adopted in large part.  Like
the water commissions, the board would also be responsible for writing and
enforcing regulations that would implement its plan.  It would specify the
environmental reviews necessary prior to site development, standards to mit-
igate wildlife impacts, required setbacks of renewable technology from other
land uses, and minimum bonding requirements, among other regulations.  To
accomplish these many tasks, this regional energy board should have its own
offices and staff and should implement careful cost-sharing measures.
Independent renewable energy boards will avoid entrenching the re-
newable development approval process within an existing institution where
one state or several interested parties have strong participatory advantages,
ensure more equitable costs, and provide a clear point of contact for devel-
opers and concerned parties.  To ensure this clear point of contact, however,
the board will have to consolidate multiple rights that currently exist within
renewable parcels, and this will require a careful balancing of interests.
B. Consolidating Rights of Exclusion Within One Agency
As this Article has established, planned utility-scale renewable develop-
ments often cross private boundaries and municipal and county lines.  The
Bureau of Land Management, several property owners, many municipal and
county governments, and several state and federal entities may therefore all
have a right to exclude the proposed development through the denial of a
lease, a review process that is particularly deferential to objectors, or various
permitting and zoning processes.  An institution to govern utility-scale
renewables development and to address these challenges must pull these
many exclusion rights within one organization.  This is not to say that exclu-
sion rights must be weakened or modified — although in some cases this
may be necessary; the consolidation will, first and foremost, be procedural.
The many parties who have a right to block a development must exercise
their exclusion rights through a process led by one institution, and the hierar-
chies among these parties must be clarified.
As discussed in Part III, several states have created streamlined site
certification processes or “consolidated energy facility siting programs”381
for energy projects, which accomplish this necessary collecting of rights
within one process and, in some cases, substantively consolidate the rights
380 See supra text accompanying note 255 (describing how the Western Governors’ Asso- R
ciation has identified the ideal regions for renewable development in the West).
381 Comparison of Siting Requirements, OR. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.oregon.gov/
ENERGY/SITING/compare.shtml (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
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through preemption.  Generally, these processes give one agency the power
to review, apply, and enforce all federal, state, and local laws that govern an
energy project.  In Washington, the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
has the exclusive power to receive and review certain energy facility site
applications,382 as do similar institutions in California,383 Oregon,384 and sev-
eral other states.  A similar streamlined process at the regional level for
renewables development would substantially alleviate the transaction costs
associated with the renewable anticommons.  The renewable energy board
could eliminate overlapping parties’ rules, combine certain processes (such
as multiple environmental reviews required prior to permit release), and de-
velop compromise standards where rules conflict.  If a proposed renewable
development would cover four towns, for example — all with different re-
quirements for the height of a wind turbine — the agency could hold a meet-
ing of the town councils where they would agree upon an acceptable
compromise height; this height would then become a part of the regional
energy board’s regulations.  Through this streamlining or consolidation, most
rights of exclusion would not be wholly eliminated, but the developer would
no longer have to identify and deal separately with each party.
In some cases — where one municipality bans renewable technologies,
for example — procedural mediation will be insufficient.  Some hierarchy
among rights holders must be established, and this may be most efficiently
accomplished through partial preemption of authority over renewables.  As
Minnesota385 has done, a state may remove municipalities’ land use authority
over the siting of renewable energy infrastructure.  States have also limited
or preempted municipalities’ ability to regulate, through their building codes,
the engineering specifications of renewable equipment and methods and
materials for installation, such as the required strength of a tower supporting
a wind turbine.386
Preemption of local or even state and federal laws by the regional en-
ergy board in some of these areas may be necessary — where such preemp-
tion is constitutional — both to promote regulatory efficiencies and to
reduce burdens on developers.  Indeed, there is precedent for this at the state
level.  California’s streamlined energy siting process for large thermal power
plants provides that “[t]he issuance of a certificate by the [state energy]
382 See Wash. REV. CODE § 80.50.040 (West 2010).
383 See supra note 361. R
384 See supra note 358. R
385 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.07 (West 2010) (providing that a site permit granted by
the state for a commercial wind turbine “is the only site approval required for the location” of
the turbine and that “[t]he site permit supersedes and preempts all zoning, building, or land
use rules, regulations, or ordinances adopted by regional, county, local, and special purpose
governments”).
386 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65896(b) (West 2010) (prohibiting counties in California
from enacting ordinances more restrictive than the wind energy requirements set forth in the
revised California code, which address tower heights, acceptable decibel levels, and other
technical aspects of wind turbines).  Acceptable height and decibel levels are notably different
from equipment “specifications,” however, and may implicate legitimate local concerns that
differ depending on terrain and residents’ sensitivity to noise.
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commission . . . shall supersede any applicable statute, ordinance, or regula-
tion of any state, local, or regional agency, or federal agency to the extent
permitted by federal law.”387  To avoid wholly discounting the unique inter-
ests of municipalities and states, preemption of laws by the regional energy
board need not be complete, however.  Patricia Salkin and Ashira Ostrow,
for example, propose partial preemption of local wind laws similar to the
preemption within the Telecommunications Act.388  For wind energy siting,
Salkin and Ostrow would adopt provisions similar to the Act’s language,
which prohibits municipal bans on cell phone towers, heightens judicial re-
view of local zoning decisions, requires zoning decisions to be made within
a reasonable time, and requires the decisions to be made in writing.389
Partial or full preemption in several areas of renewable development is
necessary.  Specifications for the engineering of solar and wind equipment
and its installation should not need to differ widely, provided a federal or
state standard ensures their safety.  There are already model standards for
solar panel glass, for example, written by the International Organization for
Standardization, and standards for installation of solar equipment prepared
by an international association of mechanical officials.390  It is likely more
efficient for one central entity with engineering expertise to set engineering
and installation standards than for multiple authorities to do the same.  Fur-
ther, if these types of regulations were uniform, burdens on renewable devel-
opers would decline.  For a developer who consistently installs one type of
industrial-scale wind turbine, for example, neighboring municipalities’ con-
flicting specifications for tower strength could substantially increase cost.
Alternatively, regional energy boards could generally preempt local and
state laws in a compromise standard that left enforcement authority to the
constituent parties, thus granting them some power through delegation.  Mu-
nicipalities would have to follow the permitting regulations of the regional
board but could implement the regulations and perhaps augment them with
their own limited rules, provided they were not more restrictive.  The Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”) has followed this type of system.  For
certain regulations that address the construction of residences and signs, the
agency has entered into memoranda of understanding with many municipali-
ties and counties in the Lake Tahoe region.  The memoranda typically dele-
gate TRPA permitting authority to the local authority and require that the
authority follow all TRPA requirements in granting a permit.391  The agency
387 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 2010).
388 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 168, at 1095–96. R
389 Id. at 1093–97.
390 See, e.g., AUSTIN TEX. CODE §§ 25-12-191(A), 193 (2010) (adopting portions of the
Uniform Solar Energy Code published by the International Association of Plumbing and
Mechanical Officials and revising some of the installation standards contained within that
code).
391 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
and the City of South Lake Tahoe Relating to City-Wide Signage Ordinance at 1, signed May
25, 2000, available at http://www.trpa.org/documents/MOUs/Appendix_CC_CSLT_Signs_
2000.pdf (“Given the existing comprehensive regulatory structure of the CITY as it pertains to
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allows these municipalities, however, to impose their own “reasonable con-
ditions of approval” on land use permits within the Lake Tahoe region.392
No matter the level or method of preemption of municipal, state, and
even federal authority, the key element of a regional energy board will be its
procedural consolidation of rights and rights holders within one institution
and process.  Where a federal and a state environmental review were previ-
ously required, the parties within a regional energy board would collaborate
and produce one report, which would include all overlapping elements of the
review and any additional information required by the state or federal gov-
ernment.  Where separate public informational hearings were mandated by
neighboring municipalities, these would be combined in a process adminis-
tered by the regional energy board at a fair and convenient location.  Where
multiple private landowners had concerns about leasing to a renewable de-
veloper, they could negotiate within one forum administered by the board.
Landowners interested in leasing — some of whom are already forming
pools and approaching renewable developers with lease offers393 — could
have an automatic and accessible forum for collaboration.  While the trans-
action costs of forming pools on small acreages are likely low, the renewable
farms that cover thousands of acres of land could make pooling difficult, and
an accessible, centralized institution with expertise in the development are
could reduce these costs.  Just as the Western Governors’ Association has
already begun to do,394 the more formal regional energy board could also
aggregate buyers of renewables by informing them of developments in the
approval process.
Finally, regional energy boards could group together the many inter-
ested parties in the transmission construction process and assist in transmis-
the installation of signs within the City of South Lake Tahoe . . . the CITY and TRPA agree
that the City shall review permanent signage activities within the CITY limits of South Lake
Tahoe.  Such review by the CITY shall include application of all applicable TRPA regulations
to signage projects otherwise subject to TRPA review.”); Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and Placer County at 1, signed May 11, 1997,
available at http://www.trpa.org/documents/MOUs/Appendix_DD_Placed_Signs_1997.pdf
(providing the same for Placer County); Memorandum of Understanding Between Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency and Placer County at 1, signed Feb. 27, 1995, available at http://
www.trpa.org/documents/MOUs/Appendix_R_Placer_Residential_1995.pdf (“Given the ex-
isting comprehensive regulatory structure of COUNTY as it pertains to construction of resi-
dential structures within the County of Placer . . . COUNTY and TRPA agree that COUNTY
shall review construction of new single and multiple-family structures . . . to be constructed
within the COUNTY limits of Placer County.  Such review by COUNTY shall include appli-
cation of all applicable TRPA regulations to residential construction projects otherwise subject
to TRPA review”); Memorandum of Understanding Between Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency and the County of El Dorado, signed Jan. 15, 1993, available at  http://www.trpa.org/
documents/MOUs/Appendix_W_El_Dorado_Residential_1992.pdf  (providing the same for El
Dorado County).
392 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
and the City of South Lake Tahoe Relating to City-Wide Signage Ordinance, supra note 391, R
at ¶4.
393 Martin, supra note 373, at 444–45 (“In Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyo- R
ming, some landowners are pooling their land to form wind associations that market the land
to wind energy companies.”).
394 See supra note text accompanying note 269. R
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sion siting.  This regional process, too, has already been jumpstarted by the
Western Governors’ Association in its effort to plan for transmission corri-
dors in collaboration with federal agencies;395 the regional energy board thus
has a base from which to expand.  Many existing procedures and rules for
transmission siting would need to change if the boards were to have primary
jurisdiction over transmission siting,396 but the federal government has al-
ready gained potential control over the transmission siting process,397 and
regional entities would serve as important procedural forums for this process
— as they already are doing in the West.398  With an improved transmission
process, where states and municipalities collaboratively agreed upon accept-
able siting for transmission lines running from renewable parcels, developers
would have an up-front assurance of transmission and could build with more
confidence.399
C. Applying the Regional Model to Other Energy Anticommons
Large-scale renewable projects operate within a distinct anticommons
because renewable parcels — new property lines — are drawn around areas
with strong sunlight and wind.  Each parcel may overlie land owned by sev-
eral private property owners and governed by several municipalities, states,
and the federal government.  Other energy projects, although different, face
somewhat similar anticommons obstacles.
Nuclear power plants may continue to be a necessary piece of
America’s energy portfolio.400  Concerns about high water use, terrorist at-
395 See Energy and Transmission Initiative, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://www.westgov.
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129&Itemid=57 (last visited May
20, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting that under a Department of
Energy Grant, “[t]he Western Governors’ Association, Western Interstate Energy Board and
Western Electricity Coordinating Council are working with diverse stakeholders through the
Regional Transmission Expansion Project to analyze transmission requirements . . . and to
develop long-term, interconnection-wide transmission expansion plans”).
396 See, e.g., Brown & Rossi, supra note 41, at 714–16 (explaining that “in Colorado, all R
proposed new transmission lines are required to obtain local approvals”; in Utah, all applicants
must obtain a local siting permit; and in Wyoming, local approvals are also required).
397 See id. at 741 (explaining that through the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress dele-
gated “authority to Department of Energy (‘DOE’) to designate National Interest Energy
Transmission Corridors (‘NIETCs’) and to FERC to exercise some ‘backstop’ permitting au-
thority over states within the NIETCs”).
398 See W. GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, supra note 395. R
399 One final means of addressing the anticommons-type challenges to renewable develop-
ment is not addressed here but merits future research.  If states were to recognize a “fugitive
estate” — similar to the mineral estate for oil and gas — this could substantially reduce the
tragedy.  Just as lessees of mineral estates have the right to reasonable use of the surface —
regardless of the exclusion rights in the surface estate — owners of a wind or solar estate could
trump certain surface rights in order to capture the sun or wind flowing over property.  Ernest
Smith and Becky Diffen observe that states like Texas have begun to recognize severed wind
rights, for example, and that further application of oil and gas law principles to the field of
wind will likely benefit wind developers.  Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of
Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 165 (2010).
400 See supra text accompanying note 100. R
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tacks, and storage and disposal of the waste are substantial, however.401  Due
to the need for careful regulation of the plants, multiple parties have the right
to block their construction and thus nullify the entire property bundle.  One
party may object to the location, another to the construction of the physical
plant, and another to the economic feasibility of the plant.  Even with federal
preemption of state regulation of nuclear safety, states and municipalities
have found ways to exclude nuclear plants.402  The plants have historically
been so expensive to site and build — largely due to the thick layer of regu-
lations that they face — that most nuclear power plants are old facilities with
extended licenses; developers have only recently begun to propose new con-
struction.403  This new surge in applications is due in part to innovative fed-
eral programs that have started to address the anticommons challenge in
nuclear power.  Through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Early Site
Permit program, for example, the Commission consolidates “safety issues,
environmental protection issues, and plans for coping with emergencies”
into one process and notifies all stakeholders of a single participatory pro-
cess to address these issues.404 Only federal incentives and streamlined per-
mitting processes like this will allow nuclear energy, with its layers of
onerous yet necessary regulations, to thrive.  As with any form of energy
development, however, “streamlining” should not mean less substantive
regulation or laxer review. Rather, the regulation necessary to ensure the
safety of the energy infrastructure and the mitigation of its impacts should be
procedurally consolidated in a process that reduces transaction costs to all
parties who participate in regulatory decisions, including the developer and
the public.
Fossil fuels such as oil and gas may also face unique regional chal-
lenges, since reservoirs of these resources do not follow existing jurisdic-
tional or private property lines.405  Local, state, and some federal regulations
in the environmental and land use areas all apply to the extraction of these
fuels,406 although production companies have received exemptions from
401 See FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
1045–49, 1122 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing terrorism and waste issues).
402 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216
(1983) (holding that California’s ban on nuclear power plants until they had adequate tempo-
rary and permanent disposal systems for their fuel rods was not preempted by federal law).
403 See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 401, at 1018–19 (describing how the “104 pres- R
ently operating nuclear power reactors were licensed” under old regulations, how under this
statute, “many issues . . . [that industry] thought were resolved in the construction permit
stage were reopened in the operating permit stage” and how applications commenced again
only after the NRC changed the regulations).
404 Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html (last visited May 20, 2011) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
405 See, e.g., Shale Gas Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.
eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/rpd/shale_gas.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (showing a map where most shale plays cross several state lines).
406 See, e.g., GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL & ALL CONSULTING, supra note 93, at 25 R
(“The development and production of oil and gas in the U.S., including shale gas, are regu-
lated under a complex set of federal, state, and local laws.”).
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many of the major federal regulations.407  As with renewable technology or
nuclear power plants, a zoning board may object that oil or gas drilling is not
permitted in the area in which it is proposed, another party may find that the
drilling itself will cause too much environmental damage, and yet another
might refuse to offer a lease for mineral production.  The challenges of siting
and operating rigs to extract these fuels have been highlighted recently in the
Appalachian region, where New York has placed a moratorium on a new
form of natural gas extraction (slickwater hydraulic fracturing, or “frac-
ing”),408 while Pennsylvania has welcomed it,409 although it has imposed ad-
ditional regulations.410  Further, towns in Pennsylvania have attempted to
exert their own rights by zoning out the practice.411  Collaboration through
regional forums might help states and municipalities to share their informa-
tion about risks and benefits of oil and gas extraction practices and poten-
tially reach compromise standards.
Construed broadly, anticommons-type problems could potentially arise
in any situation where a complicated layer of regulations and ownership
rights applied to a property.412  But in the most compelling examples, the
rights of exclusion actively block productive activity and allow less of the
activity than is desirable, as has occurred with renewables and perhaps other
forms of energy.  In many cases, these regulations are justified and neces-
sary, and “desirable” levels of production must be accurately measured by
gauging environmental and social impacts.  New York, for example, is con-
ducting a thorough environmental analysis of the effects of hydraulic frac-
turing in the midst of its moratorium;413 until it is convinced of the safety of
the practice, it is willing to reject the potential profits.414  For other states, a
careful balance between renewable technology installation and protected
407 See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 241–48 (discussing exemptions of hydraulic fracturing R
and certain oil and gas activities more generally from portions of the Clean Water Act, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
408 See DIV. OF MINERAL RES., supra note 38 (explaining that the Department had re- R
ceived applications for slickwater hydraulic fracturing and that permits would not be issued
until the impact statement was completed); Governor Paterson Vetoes Natural Gas Drilling
Moratorium, CBS News, Dec. 11, 2010 (explaining that the governor vetoed a moratorium on
gas drilling that passed the New York State Senate and Assembly but prohibited hydraulic
fracturing for natural gas through at least July 2011).
409 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. R
410 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 40, at 260–67 (discussing Pennsylvania requirements
for the disposal of flowback water from hydraulic fracturing).
411 See supra note 39 (discussing towns’ attempts to restrict hydraulic fracturing). R
412 Indeed, in 1976 — addressing large non-renewable power plant siting — Professors
Norman Wengert and Robert Lawrence expressed puzzlement “as to why the regional system
has received so little attention in the data used by state governments in considering energy
facility siting decisions” and “why siting decisions do not give more emphasis to regional
system interrelationships.” NORMAN WENGERT & ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, REGIONAL FACTORS
IN SITING AND PLANNING ENERGY FACILITIES IN THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES: A REPORT TO
THE WESTERN INTERSTATE NUCLEAR BOARD I–10 (1976).
413 See DIV. OF MINERAL RES., supra note 38 (examining the potential environmental and R
health effects of hydraulic fracturing).
414 See id.
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habitat must be met,415 and the costs of renewable development to consumers
must be carefully considered.
“Desirable” energy production is not unlimited production.  But if a
better method of combining, implementing, and enforcing the many exclu-
sion rights within regional energy developments could be achieved, all par-
ties would benefit.  Transaction costs for producers would decline.  Those
opposed to development, although no longer able to block a project by with-
holding a single stick of the bundle,416 would have a central forum where
they could voice all concerns.  And within this coherent forum, an efficient
level of production would ideally be determined by debate and consensus,
not unmanageable transaction costs.
Beyond the physical siting and development of energy infrastructure,
energy planning more generally faces substantial hurdles because regional
energy planning institutions are scarce.  Energy resources are not allocated
along state lines, but energy planning is.  Generally, states individually de-
termine the need for new energy resources and grant certificates of conve-
nience and necessity to new power plants that are deemed beneficial to the
public.  But many states lack sufficient electricity generation resources and
must import electricity through transmission lines.  If states collaborated in
determining when and where new power plants and transmission lines
should be built, “source” and “sink” states could have a much more effi-
cient system of energy provision.417  Sink states that imported electricity
could collaborate with neighboring sink states to build needed transmission
or form a purchasing pool.  Producing states with better knowledge of export
needs could better plan for the expansion of power plants.  Some of this
coordination already occurs through regional entities, which address the reli-
ability of transmission, and regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”)
and independent system operators (“ISOs”) that run the wholesale transmis-
sion market.  These transmission organizations identify constraints and bot-
tlenecks in the lines,418 ensure that the lines are physically intact and
operating smoothly,419 arrange for the expansion or construction of new
415 See Bronin, supra note 218, at 11 (describing the potential habitat impacts of wind R
energy); S.A. Abbasi & Naseema Abbasi, The Likely Adverse Environmental Impacts of Re-
newable Energy Sources, 65 APPLIED ENERGY 121, 132 (2000) (discussing solar farms’ poten-
tial “direct destruction of desert habitats for burrowing animals and other desert wildlife”).
416 See Heller, supra note 17, at 639 (explaining that in an anticommons, “even if only R
one party opposes the use, that party may be able to block others from exercising their
rights”).
417 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 41. R
418 There are two types of regional transmission organizations.  The first — regional enti-
ties — are tasked solely with ensuring the physical reliability of the grid.  The second —
independent system operators and regional transmission organizations — plan for grid expan-
sion, schedule flows of electricity over the grid, and run transmission markets. See generally
FERC, Regional Transmission Organizations, 18 C.F.R. § 35 (1999) (describing RTOs and
ISOs); Clinton A. Vince et al., What is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?,
27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 66–74 (2006) (same); Scott Grover, FERC Guidance Order Shows Inter-
Agency Tension, 23 NAT. RES. & ENV’T. 61, 62–67 (2009) (describing regional entities).
419 See Grover, supra note 418, at 67. R
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transmission lines,420 and schedule flows of electricity through the grid.421
All of this takes place on a regional basis, since transmission lines do not
follow jurisdictional boundaries.  But when the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission tried to require states to more generally plan for future energy
needs on a regional basis, they resisted.422  As energy prices continue to fluc-
tuate, however, and states struggle to provide a constant supply of energy to
their residents, this resistance might fade.  Further, a successful demonstra-
tion of regional governance through a regional energy board could convince
states of the benefit of this type of coordination beyond renewables.
CONCLUSION
Renewable energy is an essential component of America’s future en-
ergy mix, and governments have placed a strong priority on its rapid devel-
opment.  There are substantial obstacles to the construction of utility-scale
renewable farms, however, which must be remedied.
First, renewable energy development has many characteristics of a clas-
sic anticommons tragedy, and this has contributed to the underdevelopment
of renewables.  Ideal renewable parcels exist where the fugitive sun or wind
resources flowing over the land are particularly steady and strong.  Numer-
ous private property lines and jurisdictional boundaries, which were typi-
cally formed in ignorance of these fugitive resources, divide many
renewable parcels.  Alternatively, even for a parcel overlying just one piece
of property within one jurisdiction, multiple parties within the parcel all
have existing rights to the land and potentially to the fugitive resources flow-
ing over it, and thus numerous opportunities exist to exclude renewable de-
velopers by denying a lease, rejecting a proposed permit, or blocking the
project on numerous regulatory grounds.
Second, where multiple jurisdictions have partial responsibility over re-
newable siting, as is often the case, regulatory gaps often remain.  No one
entity has the power or incentive to take the regulatory helm, and this regula-
tory commons tragedy can lead to insufficient governance frameworks for
renewable siting.  In turn, this may lead to the underdevelopment of renewa-
ble technology, or development may occur in a fashion that insufficiently
420 See, e.g., Ill. Commerce  Comm’n. v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 474 (2009) (discussing a
new transmission line planned by a regional transmission organization and financed by the
organization’s members in the Midwest region); Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,
593 F.3d 30, 32 (2010) (discussing planned transmission expansions by an independent system
operator in the New England region).
421 See Vince, supra note 418, at 66–74 (describing RTO and ISO functions). R
422 See FERC, Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Ser-
vice and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,4252, 55,479 (July 31, 2002) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (proposing “regional state advisory committees” to coordinate
and plan regional electricity markets); FERC, WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM, (2003)
(backing away from the requirement of creating or joining Independent Transmission Provid-
ers but still requiring public utilities to join regional transmission organizations on their own
timeline).
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addresses environmental and social concerns associated with the siting of
semi-permanent infrastructure.
Finally, renewable energy is typically transported as electricity, and the
best renewable resources are often far from population centers.  New trans-
mission lines must be built, like the renewable projects themselves, cross
multiple property lines and jurisdictions.  Without an assurance of available
transmission, developers will not build.
To address these challenges to the siting of utility-scale renewable en-
ergy, municipalities, states, Native American tribes, and the federal govern-
ment must collaborate to form regional institutions called regional energy
boards.  Each board must pull together the exclusion rights of multiple au-
thorities within a region.  Each must possess regulatory powers over the sit-
ing of renewable plants; provide processes through which the parties can
negotiate and resolve conflicting rights; create clear hierarchies among rights
(through preemption, if necessary); and offer centralized and accessible
processes through which the rights are applied to the renewable parcel.
These regional energy boards must offer a consolidated forum of managea-
ble exclusion rights in order to reduce the high transaction costs of the re-
newable energy anticommons.
At first blush, this proposed governance institution may appear to be an
unrealistic hypothetical, but history proves this to be untrue.  States and
Congress have entered into formal compacts delegating substantial regula-
tory authority over land use and water resources to regional entities.  In the
water resource area, regional institutions formed by states and the federal
government and approved by Congress have managed comprehensive regu-
latory schemes for more than thirty years.423  In the renewables area, the
Western Governors’ Association has already formed regional institutions,
which, although informal, aim to identify renewable zones and develop
transmission corridors from these zones.  Further, states have recognized the
need for regional governance of energy more generally and have authorized
their agencies to participate in regional forums.424  Existing regional models
provide ample patterns to emulate in the formation of new regional boards.
Regional energy boards must be implemented and tested not only to
hasten renewable development but also to encourage regional governance
beyond renewable technology.  From the mining or drilling of fuel from
common reservoirs to planning for electricity production and transmission
needs, energy is inherently a regional enterprise that requires collaborative
attention.  States cannot close their eyes to the resource activities surround-
ing their borders, and regional governance would allow for shared expertise,
avoidance of overlapping regulation, and fewer transaction costs for all par-
ties in the energy development and planning process.
It is time for the modernization of energy governance in the United
States, and small yet important steps toward regional energy models suggest
423 See supra text accompanying notes 282–346. R
424 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. R
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that there is adequate momentum for this change.  Regional energy boards
are a necessary step toward this transition, not only to reduce the obstacles to
the development of this essential form of energy but also to demonstrate
how other areas of energy development could benefit from a regional gov-
ernance structure.  The isolation and fragmentation of energy planning and
development in the United States is a flaw that can no longer be ignored.
Without the rapid implementation of an improved system, our security —
indeed, our economy and way of life — will remain at risk.
